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ABSTRACT 
 
Since 1986, Vietnam started to move from a centrally-planned towards a market-
oriented system. It underwent several major economic and trade reforms – a process 
which is still not completed. At the same time, it also started to open its economy. 
Vietnam has become a member of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), signed 
several bilateral trade agreements and is currently negotiating accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). First positive results of the reform process became visible in 
the early 1990s when poverty declined to a large extent. Since then, the Vietnamese 
agricultural sector has also experienced high growth and impressive export achievements. 
The country changed from a food importer to one of the major exporters worldwide. The 
question arises to what extent support policies contributed to this growth, especially of 
the agricultural sector. 
In order to answer this question, domestic and trade policies in the agricultural 
sector are analysed and the market price support (MPS) and producer support estimates 
(PSEs) are calculated. To account for the special conditions in Vietnam, the MPS and 
PSEs are adjusted for country- and commodity-specific factors like transportation costs, 
marketing margins and the quality difference of exportables (or importables) at the border 
and domestically. The selected agricultural commodities for which the MPS and PSEs are 
estimated include rice, coffee, tea, rubber, pepper, sugar, groundnut, cashew nut and pig 
meat. These nine commodities are the main agricultural products and exportables of 
Vietnam. Their shares in total output exceed 70% allowing for a generalization of the 
calculated PSEs, thus roughly representing the whole agricultural sector.  
The finding is that most agricultural products were taxed in the mid 1980s until 
the mid 1990s. This was often due to large inefficiencies in the production and processing 
of agricultural commodities, the dominance and monopoly position of the state-owned 
sector, restrictive trade policies like import and export quotas and licenses, and distorted 
markets and prices in the country. The domestic reform process, the opening of the 
 iii
economy since the early 1990s, and the shift from an import-substitution strategy towards 
export-promotion, however, impacted on the gaps between the domestic and international 
prices. Thus, since the mid 1990s, the support of agriculture increased - but still reaching 
only rather low levels. At its peak, the %PSE for the agricultural sector was 21.4% which 
is moderate compared with other countries. The low level of protection implies that 
Vietnam may not face excessive difficulties in its further international integration.  
This study of Vietnam is the third comprehensive review conducted within an 
IFPRI project on understanding and assessing domestic and trade policies in the 
agricultural sector in developing countries. The data are meant to deliver a basis for 
further trade-related research to be conducted in the future.  
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AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN VIETNAM:  
PRODUCER SUPPORT ESTIMATES, 1986-2002 
 
Hoa Nguyen and Ulrike Grote1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1995, many 
developing countries have entered negotiations to join. Within these negotiations, 
agricultural subsidies and protection occupy a prominent place with different countries or 
country groups presenting different positions (Beierle, 2002). Nevertheless, there is 
agreement that current restrictions and distortions on the agricultural world markets need 
to be corrected. Article 20 (d) of the Agreement on Agriculture gives a clear mandate for 
further instruments that are suitable to address the commitment of creating a fair 
agricultural trading system that will recognize the special needs of developing countries.  
While in most industrialized countries, agriculture has been highly subsidized, 
many developing countries have put their agricultural sectors into a disadvantageous 
situation by promoting and subsidizing the industrial sector, while taxing their 
agricultural sector. However, detailed information on agricultural protection levels in 
developing countries is scarce.  
To fill this gap in research and to create a basis for further trade-related analysis to 
be conducted in the future, a project has been initiated by IFPRI to understand and assess 
agricultural policies and to measure producer support estimates (PSEs) for agricultural 
products in some selected Asian countries. The PSE calculation is a methodology 
developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  
                                                 
1 Center for Development Research (ZEF), Walter-Flex-Str.3, 53113 Bonn, Germany, http://www.zef.de. 
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Among various protection rates, the PSEs have been increasingly used. While for 
all OECD countries, and recently, for many transition countries, the PSEs are regularly 
being measured and annually updated, less empirical research exists on protection rates in 
developing countries. This is partly because of the danger of measuring inaccurate PSEs 
due to high transaction costs or quality differences in many developing countries. Thus, 
adaptations of the reference prices to the specific circumstances in developing countries 
has to be included by accounting for factors like transportation cost, marketing margins 
and quality differences. 
This study on Vietnam is one of the first country studies within this project, which 
will produce an in-depth analysis of the development of the agricultural situation and 
policy since 1986. It has been financially supported by GTZ funds provided by the Center 
for Development Research (ZEF) in Bonn. First papers on measurement issues and their 
importance for measuring PSEs in developing countries with some empirical results from 
India, China and Indonesia have already been published by IFPRI2.  
With the aim of entering the WTO by the year 2005, Vietnam has actively 
participated in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations since 1995. Within the 
agricultural negotiations, the Government of Vietnam provided a document compiling 
agricultural domestic support and export subsidies. This was, however, criticized due to 
the lack of statistics (WTO, 2003). Specifically, little is known about the actual level of 
protection in the agricultural sector.  
                                                 
2 Kathleen Mullen, Dongsheng Sun, David Orden and Ashok Gulati, Producer Support Estimates (PSEs) 
for Agriculture in Developing Countries: Measurement Issues and Illustrations from India and China, 
MTID Discussion Paper No. 74, IFPRI, Washington D.C., 2004.  
Mullen, Kathleen, David Orden and Ashok Gulati. 2004. Agricultural Policies in India: Producer Support 
Estimates 1985-2002, Draft MTID Discussion Paper, IFPRI, Washington, D.C. 
Thomas, Marcelle and David Orden. 2004. Agricultural Policies in Indonesia: Producer Support Estimates 
1985-2003, MTID Discussion Paper No. 78, IFPRI, Washington D.C. 
Cheng, Fuzhi and David Orden. 2004. Exchange Rate Misalignment and Its Effects on Agricultural 
Producer Support Estimates: Empirical Evidence from India and China, Draft MTID Discussion Paper, 
IFPRI, Washington, D.C. 
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In the last sixteen years, Vietnam’s economy grew rapidly with an annual rate of 
7%. The agricultural sector experienced an impressive development, changing the 
country from a food importing position to one of the leading exporters of several 
agricultural commodities in the world. However, how can this impressive growth be 
explained? Has the government largely protected the agricultural sector during this 
period? To what extent is the agricultural sector distorted by agricultural policy 
measures? Or did trade liberalization mainly contribute to this growth?  
This report first analyzes the economic and agricultural situation, the reform 
process towards a market-oriented economy since 1986, and the agricultural policy in 
Vietnam. Second, data on Vietnam are analyzed, and PSEs are calculated. The results are 
then discussed in the context of Vietnam’s trade policy. The paper ends with conclusions 
and policy recommendations.  
 
 
2. ECONOMIC AND AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN VIETNAM  
2.1 THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
After the reunification of North and South Vietnam in 1975, the collectivization 
of agriculture was promoted in the South where farmers were mostly involved in small-
scale farming. Thus, initially, Vietnam largely remained centrally-planned. Production 
and the trading of goods were carried out by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or 
cooperatives following plans made by the government. The prices were set by the state 
pricing committee.  
During this time, the government put strong emphasis on supporting heavy 
industries while promoting food self-sufficiency in the agricultural sector. Poor economic 
performance was reflected in chronic shortages, rationing and dependence on rice imports 
in the early 1980s. Industrial and perennial crops were sold to the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU) and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) in exchange for machines 
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and technical equipment. However, with the collapse of the FSU and CEECs, Vietnam 
lost its main trading partners and its major sources of aid. At the same time, the 
inefficiency of SOEs and cooperatives caused a huge budget deficit, and inflation reached 
a level of 100-200%, with hyperinflation of about 300% annually at times. In 1986, the 
inflation rate even arrived at a level of more than 700% (Tri Hung Nguyen, 1999). 
In 1986, the government started to move towards a market-oriented system. An 
economic reform called ‘Doi Moi’ was launched promoting agriculture, as well as the 
production of export products and consumer goods like textiles (Politburo, 1987).  The 
contractual quota system which was established in the agricultural sector in 1981 was 
further refined to promote agricultural production. Farmers received land from the 
cooperatives for cultivation. While they had to deliver a predetermined amount of the 
output from this land to the cooperatives, they were allowed to keep the surplus. In 
addition, the reform included liberalizing domestic and international trade, opening the 
economy to foreign investment, acknowledging the existence of the private sector, and 
developing a two-tier banking system. The Vietnamese currency Dong was depreciated 
against the US Dollar several times.  
In 1989, the government launched a comprehensive stabilization program that 
included contracting fiscal and monetary policies. Subsidies to SOEs were reduced, 
government spending was tightened, the tax system was restructured, and inflationary 
finance by the state bank was ceased. In addition, the reform included almost complete 
price liberalization and an encouragement of the private sector.  
The results of the economic reform process emerged at the beginning of the 
1990s. Major achievements were the low inflation rates of around 10% per year 
throughout the 1990s and increases in foreign direct investment, private investments and 
exports (World Bank, 2004). Between 1988 and 1993, the value of exports increased 2.5 
times to a value of US$ 838 million, and the supply of foodstuffs at relatively stable 
prices became abundant. Also GDP per capita increased from US$ 170 in the mid 1980s 
to US$ 480 in 2000, reaching a growth rate of about 7% annually. Poverty - measured as 
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the share of poor households in total population - declined from 58% in 1993 to 37% in 
1998 and 29% in 2002, while the Human Development Index (HDI) increased from 
0.523 in 1993 to 0.671 in 1998 and 0.691 in 2002 (Figure 1).  
Figure 1—Evolution of Poverty, HDI and GDP in Vietnam 
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Source: MOLISA (a), UNDP (2004), World Bank (2004). 
 
In 1991, agriculture, industry and services accounted for 31, 25 and 43% of GDP. 
In 2001, ten years later, agriculture, industry and services accounted for 24, 38 and 39% 
of GDP, respectively (World Bank, 2004). This change indicates a decreasing share of 
the agricultural sector and an increasing share of the industrial sector in Vietnam’s GDP, 
reflecting a changing export structure from initially more agricultural products to more 
industrial products. Social issues like poverty reduction have been receiving more 
attention by the government as a growing economy has led to an increasing availability of 
government funds.  
Since the early 1990s, a public administration reform program has been 
implemented in Vietnam. The idea of this program is to decentralize by transferring fiscal 
and political responsibilities from the central to the local authorities. It aims at giving 
power and ownership to the local people. A decentralized approach may help to improve 
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targeting the poor. However, there are still a few shortcomings of the whole 
decentralization process which need to be overcome to achieve a tangible positive 
outcome. While political and fiscal decentralization seems to be well under way, 
administrative decentralization still hampers the whole decentralization efforts, thus 
failing to remove administrative barriers. In addition, regional inequalities are likely to 
increase if the government fails to implement decentralization properly (Bonschab and 
Klump, 2004). 
Recently, the Vietnamese government has been concerned with promoting 
regional and international integration. Vietnam has become a member of the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA), signed several bilateral trade agreements and is currently 
negotiating accession to the WTO. This deepening integration into world markets has 
major implications for Vietnam’s economy and policies. Tariffs and non-tariff trade 
barriers (NTBs) for international trade have been reduced and more sectors opened to 
foreign investors, subsidies to SOEs have been cut and export quotas have been lifted. 
Second, the government reduced discriminations against private investors providing a 
legal system, facilitating their establishment and operation.  
2.2 THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR  
During the 1990s, the agricultural sector of Vietnam grew by about 4.4% annually 
reaching a peak of up to 7 % in 1992. This growth rate is comparable to China (4.6%) 
and also exceeds many other developing countries (Kherallah and Goletti, 2000).   
2.2.1  Production of Major Commodities 
Vietnam’s topography and climatic conditions are favorable for growing tropical 
as well as subtropical crops. About 2.8 million hectares of land are being cultivated of 
which one million hectares are being irrigated.  
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As can be seen in Figure 2, agricultural development is largely due to the increase 
in crop output. The production and export of livestock products is mainly constrained by 
quality aspects related to livestock and backward processing technology.  
Figure 2—Development and Structure of the Agricultural Sector, 1990-2000 
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In 2000, the agricultural sector accounted for about 25% of GDP, 13% of export 
revenue, 8% of total import values and created employment for 61% of the labor force 
(Figure 3). The share of agricultural export in total export of Vietnam is higher than in 
other countries in the Southeast Asian region and three times the average level of the 
world (Anderson,  1998). The shares of agriculture in GDP and total employment 
declined from 40% and 72% in 1985 to 25% and 61% in 2000, respectively. 
Nevertheless, they remain rather high emphasizing the important role of agriculture in the 
economy. 
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Figure 3—Shares of agriculture in GDP, employment and foreign trade, 1985-2000 
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Source: World Bank (2004), FAO (2004), MOLISA (b), GSO. 
Despite such important role of the agricultural sector in the Vietnamese economy, 
this sector has received much less protection than other sectors (Table 1). The effective 
protection over agriculture even declined over the five years from 1997-2002. The 
remarkably high protection over manufacturing was argued to protect infant industries 
and has been largely applied to import substitution sectors like vehicles (motorbikes and 
automobiles); chemicals and chemical products; food and beverages; as well as iron, steel 
and non-ferrous metals. Industrial exports of main commodities other than crude oil, 
included garments and footwear, handicrafts, and electronic products, and increased over 
time with a growth rate smaller than agricultural exports.  
 
Table 1—Effective protection over Vietnamese economic sectors, 1997 and 2002  
 
Sector              1997                2002 
Agriculture                 7.7                  7.4 
Mining                 6.1                16.4 
Manufacturing             121.5                96.0 
Average               59.5                54.1 
Source: Athukorala (2002) quoted in Auffret (2003), p. 6. 
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Regarding the structure of agricultural crops, food crops accounted for 60% of 
total value of agricultural output, while industrial and perennial crops, and fruit and 
vegetables accounted for 24% and 14%, respectively (Figure 4).  
Figure 4—Share of agricultural crops in total value of plant output, 2000 
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Within food crops, rice is the main item, accounting for 85% of total cultivated 
land and 43% of total output value in 2000. Vietnam has even become the fifth largest 
producer of rice worldwide. Most of it is produced by wet rice cultivation in the Red and 
Mekong River Deltas of Vietnam. The dominance of rice is due to the fact that self-
sufficiency in rice was promoted throughout the first half of the 1980s. During the 1990s, 
the annual growth rate of paddy rice production was 4.4%. This increase was mainly due 
to seed improvement and crop intensification. Thus, rice yields grew from 2.8 tons/ha in 
1986 to 3.1 tons/ha in 1990 and 4.1 tons/ha in 2000. In addition, major incentives to rice 
production were provided by the land reforms, the improved infrastructure especially 
with respect to irrigation, and easier access to inputs like fertilizer and pesticides. Other 
important food crops include maize, as can be seen in Figure 5, but also sweet potatoes 
and cassava.  
 
 10
Figure 5—Share of main products in total agricultural output value, 2000 
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Coffee is the most important industrial crop in Vietnam. Ninety-five percent of 
the Vietnamese coffee is the Robusta type. It has been produced since 1975, mainly on 
small-scale coffee farms equipped with different processing knowledge and technology. 
Thus, the quality of coffee varies in Vietnam. The yields of coffee amount to about 1,300 
kilograms per hectare, which is twice the world average. Apart from coffee, important 
other industrial and perennial crops are rubber, sugarcane, groundnut, soybean, tea and 
pepper (Figure 5).  
In the late 1990s, world market prices of rice and coffee declined so that the 
government started to promote diversification away from rice and coffee. In Figure 6, it 
can be seen that there has been a steady increase in production volumes for almost all 
products over time.  
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Figure 6—Production of agricultural commodities, in million tons, 1985-2003 
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Sugarcane production in general followed an increasing trend since 1975 though 
yields remained low and there have been considerable fluctuations in output in some 
years. In 1994, a one-million-ton sugar program was launched, which aimed at achieving 
self-sufficiency in sugar by 2000, thus replacing sugar imports, and creating employment 
for farmers. Based on this program, sugarcane output increased steadily - largely due to 
planted area expansion - except for 2000. Since 2000, the inefficient performance of 
many small sugar refineries resulted in the switch of farmers to other crops and the 
decline in sugarcane volume. 
Also the rubber production has steadily increased over time. It has been mainly 
produced in state-managed farms, and farmers have been given specific tasks of planting, 
caring of rubber trees and gathering rubber latex. These state-managed farms belong 
either to the General Rubber Corporation (an SOE at the national level) or to SOEs at the 
provincial level. In 2000, the state-managed farms accounted for 71% of total land used 
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for growing rubber trees and 90% of total rubber latex output. Rubber grown by farm 
households accounted for the rest, and was mainly developed since 1993.  
Vietnam is the third biggest producer of cashew nut in the world. Output of 
cashew nut increased rapidly with large fluctuations during the 1990s. Productivity, 
though being higher than in other countries, is estimated to be only one third of its 
potential (IAPP, 1997). Similarly to coffee, more than 90% of the processed cashew nut 
is exported, and only 7-8% are domestically consumed due to the relatively high price.  
Vietnam ranks tenth in terms of groundnut production in the world. Production 
generally takes place on small-scale farms with low efficiency. Thus, total groundnut 
output increased mainly due to area enlargement rather than productivity improvement. 
Vietnamese groundnut productivity is just half or one third of that of other Asian 
neighboring countries.  
Tea production shows modest growth before 1996 and more rapid thereafter. 
Vietnam ranks fifth in the world in terms of tea output3. Farmers plant tea and process 
35-40% of their tea output. The remaining 60-65% is sold to processing companies (Dinh 
Long Nguyen et al. 1999). Productivity of Vietnamese tea remains lower than in the 
world and other Asian countries.  
Vietnam is the biggest pepper producer in the world, although there were wide 
fluctuations in the growth of pepper output from 1986 to 2002. Pepper is generally 
planted on small-scale farms with on average less than two hectares. All activities in 
pepper production from choosing seeds, planting, harvesting and processing are 
conducted in farming households in traditional ways with no technical means. Hence, the 
quality of pepper remains low. In addition, pepper seeds are generally old, poorly 
selected, they differ widely from each other, and pepper’s moisture cannot be properly 
controlled. 
                                                 
3 Xinhua News  Agency: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-05/20/content_400582.htm. 
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Livestock accounted for 14% of agricultural GDP with the share of pigs 
amounting to almost 60% of total livestock value in 2000. During the 1990s, the livestock 
sector increased steadily with an annual growth rate of 7%. Pork is the most important 
meat being consumed, followed by poultry (15%) and cattle (8%)4. It is mainly consumed 
because its price is lower than that for poultry and beef. Pigs are largely raised by 
households. The number of pigs in each province is roughly proportionate to the number 
of households in that province. There is large variation in the scale and technology of 
production, with the dominance of smallholders and traditional technologies. Thus, 
productivity remains very low. Pig meat is mainly for domestic consumption (95-96%) 
leaving only 4-5% for export.  
The production of poultry heads accelerated throughout the 1990s with large 
variation in scale and technology. In the early 1990s, the export of poultry and beef 
surged but remains minor compared with pig meat.  
2.2.2 The Processing Industry 
Agricultural exportables other than rice are mainly semi-processed (shelled 
coffee, dry rubber latex, and shelled groundnut). Processed items account for a very small 
part of the total export volume. This is due to the use of backward technologies by 
processing factories (Trung Que Nguyen et al., 1997). Currently, there are a few factories 
with limited capacities that polish rice, and process tea and coffee. The high share of 
unprocessed commodities in total agricultural export is a main reason causing a gap 
between export prices of Vietnam and international prices. The gap nevertheless follows 
a declining trend, reflecting the improvement in the quality of Vietnamese agricultural 
exportables (UNDP, 2004, p. 15). 
The processing industry in the sugar sector changed substantially in the 1990s. 
Within the one-million-ton sugar program, over US$ 1 billion was spent on building 
                                                 
4 Institute for Agricultural Planning and Projecting (IAPP, 2001): Report on Strategy for Developing the 
Livestock Sector in Vietnam until 2010, Hanoi.  
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sugar processing factories, facilitating the infrastructure in cane-producing areas and 
granting preferential credit to sugar factories. In addition to credit subsidies, import was 
restricted and local policies gave priority to the conversion of land for growing 
sugarcane.  
Before 1996, sugar refineries absorbed only 20% or 1.3-1.5 million tons of cane. 
Most of the cane, nearly 5 million tons, was still processed in traditional mills with an 
extraction rate amounting to only 50% of the extraction rate of industrial mills, and 
producing only low quality sugar. In 2000, Vietnam produced around 1 million tons of 
sugar of which about 75% were refined in factories and only the remaining 25% were 
processed in traditional sugar mills.  
Nevertheless, the Vietnamese sugar sector remains highly inefficient. Low 
conversion rates from cane to sugar in refineries stem largely from backward technology 
and low economies of scale. From the total forty-four sugar refineries, only six are 
relatively large while the others are very small by international standards. Eight operate 
with 80% of their capacity, have no overdue debt, and are located in stable sugarcane 
areas. Fourteen factories operate with 60-80% of their capacity, and cannot pay overdue 
debt, while the remaining twenty-two operate with less than 50% of their capacity and 
have outdated technology leading to high production costs and annual losses. These 
refineries were mostly built in locations far from the cane growing areas, thus lacking 
cane for processing. The inefficiency of the sugar factories is reflected not only in the fact 
that they suffer high losses but also that they need capital injections from the state budget 
to maintain operations. With respect to the first mentioned eight factories, the state has to 
write off their payable value added tax of VND 260 billion from 2001-03. With respect to 
the fourteen factories, the state provides VND 1,100 billion for the period 2003-05 
including writing off their payable tax in 2001-03, injecting working capital. Regarding 
the last twenty-four sugar factories, the state spends VND 5,000 billion of which VND 
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3,277 billion are used for paying their overdue debt and VND 1,689 billion for covering 
their losses5.  
Also the rubber processing industry remains rather weak although many factories 
have been upgraded and equipped with modern technology. However, the difference in 
existing processing technologies in factories causes variance in the quality of rubber latex 
resulting in difficulties in selling the products. Industries using rubber latex (automobile, 
motorbike, healthcare, house goods) are in Vietnam underdeveloped absorbing only 20% 
of rubber latex each year. The rest, 80% of rubber latex, is exported. In general, the 
quality of Vietnamese rubber latex is comparable to that of other Asian countries like 
Malaysia or Thailand where it also varies in terms of quality.  
The quality of Vietnamese cashew nut is internationally comparable. In the last 
ten years, the state has subsidized the development of the processing industry for cashew 
nut. Generally, the marketing chain for cashew nut includes farmers, private traders, 
processing factories which do the shelling, drying, classifying, and packaging for export, 
and exporting companies. In recent years, processing and exporting companies started 
buying directly from farmers. As the harvest lasts two months only, while the processing 
takes place over the whole year, large reserves are kept. Processing companies, however, 
usually lack funds to establish reserves and thus depend on private traders. 
However, with respect to groundnut, the quality in terms of weight and the oil 
content of Vietnamese groundnut is low by international standards. In addition, backward 
conditions in conservation, transportation and processing contribute to high moisture and 
low quality. The groundnut processing industry is highly underdeveloped. In general, 
technology in the processing factories is simple and the quality of oil is low (Trung Que 
Nguyen et al., 1997). The production of cooking oil just started recently and is subject to 
tariff protection. Other processed products from groundnut like margarine or canned 
groundnut, are rare and uncompetitive as compared with imported counterparts. Exported 
                                                 
5 Vietnam Electronic Newspaper (12.06.2004), available at: http://vnexpress.net/Vietnam/Kinh-
doanh/2003/09/3B9CBB17/ . 
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groundnut is shelled by farmers with simple equipment, then sorted and packed by the 
exporting companies.  
About 85% of the tea output is processed and mainly used for export while the 
rest is processed in households for domestic use. In the tea sector, of 174 processing 
companies, 12 are large scale, 46 medium and 116 small (IAPP, 2002, p. 20). Processing 
technologies have been improved, especially in large and medium scale processing 
companies but hardly in the numerous small-scale companies. The quality of tea, 
therefore, remains poor.  
In the meat sector, most processing factories have backward equipment; some 
factories recently built have more modern technology but operate below their capacity 
because of the lack of standard lean meat and scattered distribution of pig raising making 
the gathering process and transportation difficult and costly. In the early 1990s, the rate 
of loss in transportation was about 10%. The processing price is therefore high causing 
difficulties in selling domestically as well as penetrating and expanding foreign markets. 
Channels for distribution of pig meat in domestic rural areas are either (i) farmer to 
slaughterer cum retailer to consumer or (ii) farmer to slaughterer to retailer to consumer. 
In urban areas, channels for distribution are (i) farmer to trader to transporter to 
slaughterer cum wholesaler to consumer and (ii) farmer to trader cum transporter to 
processing and exporting factories.  
Recently, the government has invested in upgrading technology in processing and 
in granting export rewards to exporting companies. Vietnamese meat export prices, 
however, belong to one of the lowest in the world. This is due to the low quality of the 
pig meat and the low capacity of processing factories.  
2.2.3  Trade of Major Commodities 
Agricultural Exports 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Vietnam turned from an importer to a net exporter 
of agricultural products. Due to the trade liberalization and agricultural reforms in 
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Vietnam, the value of exports in the agricultural sector increased manifold with the main 
export commodities being rice, coffee, pepper and cashew nut, but also rubber, tea, 
groundnut, soybean, fruit and vegetables, and pork (Figure 7). Within fifteen years from 
1985 to 1999, agricultural export revenues rose from around US$ 100 million up to 
nearly US$ 2,400 million. Export of agricultural products together with export of crude 
oil, seafood and textile and footwear represent main sources of foreign exchange earnings 
to the country.  
Figure 7—Export revenue of major agricultural products of Vietnam, 1985-2002 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
m
ill
io
n 
U
S$
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Rice Coffee Rubber Cashew nut Pepper Tea Pig Meat Others
Source: FAO (2004). 
By the end of the 1990s, Vietnam ranked first in terms of pepper export turnover 
and second in terms of rice, coffee and cashew nut revenue worldwide. However, since 
2000, the export value declined. This was in part the result of recent declines in export 
volumes. But also international prices of main agricultural export products like coffee, 
rubber, rice and pepper decreased since 1999 and 2000. For example, coffee export 
volumes in 2001 exceeded the volume in 1996 by three times, but export revenue in 2001 
was lower than in 1996. Rice, rubber and pepper experienced similar situations. 
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Vietnam has become the second largest exporter of rice worldwide with the 
Mekong River Delta being the major exporting area of rice in Vietnam. At the end of the 
1980s, Vietnam was still a rice importer but with decreasing import volumes. Since 1989, 
its rice exports started to grow with little fluctuations at the beginning of the 1990s but 
with a steady increase since 1995. In 1999, rice exports stagnated again (Figure 8a). The 
steady increase was mainly a result of the economic reform from 1986, as well as the 
domestic and international trade liberalization since 1989. The economic reform raised 
rice output and this higher output volume together with the increased export quota led to 
a sharp increase in export volume. The fluctuations in export at the beginning of the 
1990s were partly due to the fact that Vietnamese trading enterprises lacked experiences 
in accessing foreign markets.  
In 1997, the government started to integrate the national rice markets by lifting 
internal barriers to trade across regions. Since 1998, private companies have been 
allowed to export rice. But a large part of the export quota was still allocated to STEs. 
The export quota was used to ensure food security and price stability. Specifically, state-
owned focal exporters of rice in 1999 which were appointed by the government and listed 
in Decision 250/QD-TTg dated December 24, 1998 accounted for about 90% of total 
export quota for the first nine months of the year. In 2001, the export quota was 
eliminated. Private companies can export without any restrictions since then.  
Vietnam is the second largest exporter of coffee world-wide and the world’s 
largest exporter of Robusta coffee. It has exported coffee since 1975 with a sharp 
increase of the export volumes during the 1990s (Figure 8b). Before 1990, 80-85% of the 
total coffee exports went to the FSU and CEECs in exchange for machinery and 
equipment. Export prices did not encourage coffee planting, they even discouraged it (Thi 
Bich Loc Tran, 2002, p. 64). Since 1991, Vietnamese coffee has been exported widely to 
different countries.  
Exported coffee is largely shelled coffee, 80% of which is produced by farmers 
and 20% by exporting companies. The quality of exported coffee varies due to the small-
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scale size of the coffee farms and their diverse technologies. The variance in coffee 
quality and the dominance of the Robusta type whose price is lower than the price for the 
Arabica type lead to lower export prices for Vietnamese coffee compared with other 
countries.  
Figure 8—Development of export volumes of major agricultural products,         
1986-2002 
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g. Pepper h. Sugar 
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Source: FAO. 
Before 1990, there were three exporters, all belonging to the Coffee Export 
Corporation (Lien hiep xuat khau ca phe). In the early 1990s, many companies competed 
in buying and exporting coffee because of high profit margins in coffee trading. In 
response, the Government launched the focal exporter policy in 1994: those members of 
the Coffee and Cacao Association whose annual export volume was above 200 tons were 
accepted as focal exporters and could export without any quantitative restrictions. During 
1995-1997, there were 30 focal exporters of which 20 accounted for 90% of the export 
volume. The focal exporter policy was phased out in March 1998. Currently, there are 
around one hundred state and private exporters in the coffee sector.  
Vietnam is also the second largest exporter of cashew nut in the world (Figure 
8d). Similarly to coffee, more than 90% of the processed cashew nut are exported, and 
only 7-8% are domestically consumed due to the relatively high price. In the last ten 
years, the country has developed its processing industry and reduced the share of 
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unprocessed cashew nut in total exports impressively. In 1990, 90% of the cashew nut 
exports were unprocessed, in 1993 around 50% and at the end of 1997 only 10%.  
In terms of groundnut export volume, Vietnam ranks seventh in the world (Figure 
8e). About 50% of groundnut production is exported. Since 1986, groundnut has been 
exported to Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia). Some of 
these countries (like Singapore, China, and Hong Kong) are intermediaries.  However, 
export generally suffers from market instability, the small size of the producers, and low 
efficiency. Due to the low quality, Vietnamese groundnut generally achieves only low 
export prices. Exported groundnuts are mainly shelled but not further processed. Shelling 
machinery used in exporting factories are of simple technology.  
Vietnam ranks eighth in terms of worldwide tea export6, and it exports 60% of its 
total tea output (Figure 8c). The tea companies process fresh buds into dried buds and 
export their products, mainly in the form of raw materials (dried buds) and recently a 
small share as finished products. Importing countries then process it for reselling or re-
exporting.  
Before 1986, the state held a monopoly position in exporting tea. Tea was 
exclusively exported by the Union of Tea Enterprises, which was state-owned. Since 
1991, export of tea has been liberalized (Thi Bich Loc Tran, 2002). However, SOEs at 
the national level still account for 60% of tea export (ISG, 2002). SOEs at the provincial 
level, private enterprises and joint-venture enterprises account for the remaining 40%.  
After 1990, rubber exports grew more quickly as international trade has been 
liberalized (Figure 8f). However, since its own processing industry is underdeveloped, 
Vietnam mainly exports rubber latex. Currently, China is the biggest trading partner, 
importing 70% of Vietnamese rubber latex. 
                                                 
6 Xinhua News  Agency: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-05/20/content_400582.htm. 
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Vietnam is the second largest pepper exporter in the world (Figure 8g). With the 
large amount of pepper exports, Vietnam will join the International Pepper Community 
(IPC), an organization currently including Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri 
Lanka7. About 90-95% of pepper output is exported. Exported pepper is mainly 
unprocessed (black) pepper. Since the quality of pepper remains low, Vietnamese pepper 
is usually sold to intermediate countries for further processing so that export prices of 
Vietnamese pepper are generally low.  
Exporting companies sign export contracts and buy pepper from private 
assemblers who gather pepper from farmers. There have been no long-term contracts 
between farmers and private assemblers or exporting companies. When the international 
price is high, private assemblers compete in purchasing pepper from farmers, and when 
the price is low, they refuse buying from farmers. Fluctuations in international prices are 
passed on to farmers; exporting companies and private assemblers take small and 
constant margins (World Bank, 2002, p. 14). Export volume increased over time but 
fluctuations in international prices lead to significant export turnover changes year by 
year.  
Vietnam changed from being an importer of sugar between 1991 and 1998, to 
being an exporter and importer from 1999 to 2001 (Figure 8h). In 2002, however, trade 
was negligible again. Importing sugar is subject to license but in practice, no license was 
issued since 1997. Only trading companies, who had been issued a license before, were 
eligible to import. Since 1998, sugar has been put on the list of commodities whose 
imports are administered by the Government. Despite being promoted by such measures, 
the Vietnamese sugar sector faces high inefficiencies.  
Pig meat is a major livestock exportable from Vietnam. Its export volume 
increased quickly in the late 1990s, however, also declined quickly again from 2000 to 
2002 (Figure 8i). Major export markets for pig meat from Vietnam are Russia, China, 
                                                 
7 http://www.mofa.gov.vn:8080/Web%20server/ForeignPolicy.nsf/0/ 
3f59cc3ef306806947256e75002dab1e?OpenDocument (accessed on 28.07.2004). 
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especially Hong Kong, Taiwan and Malaysia. Vietnamese export prices belong to the 
lowest in the world. This is due to the low quality of the pig meat and the weak capacity 
of processing factories. The quality of pig meat remains problematic as the percentage of 
lean meat is low and pigs with the high lean meat account for just 1-2% of the total 
population. Export of pig meat is basically in the form of frozen meat (the whole carcass, 
half carcass or a quarter of carcass) and canned meat. Ham and other products from lean 
meat account for a negligible part in pig meat exports from Vietnam.  
State-owned processing companies are the main exporters of pig meat, exporting 
different kinds of pig meat products. Private slaughterhouses in general face difficulties 
in meeting veterinary and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements of foreign 
importers. Current foreign importers require that slaughterhouses be certified and 
inspected for hygiene, and that meat is being tested for hygiene and quality (antibiotic 
residuals and food-poisoning bacteria (McLeod et al., 2003)). 
Agricultural Imports 
Import values of agricultural products also increased over time, however, at a 
lower level. In 2001, the import value reached half the value of exports in agriculture. 
Main imported agricultural commodities are cotton, malt, and milk, palm oil, soybean 
cake and wheat (Figure 9). Import of agricultural commodities has been deterred by tariff 
walls. The tax rate on most agricultural importables ranges between 20-50%, except for 
tobacco and alcohol where it reaches 100%.  
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Figure 9—Development of values of major agricultural imports, 1985-2002 
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3. AGRICULTURAL POLICIES  
Before 1986, agricultural production was organized in cooperatives following 
annual plans made by the state. There was equal output distribution regardless of worker 
productivities. Domestic and international trade was highly restricted. As a result, 
agricultural output stagnated and starvation occurred in several areas. During the 1976-80 
period, Vietnam had to import 170 thousand tons of rice and 1.1 million tons of food 
crops annually (Hoang Kim Tran, 1994). This called for reform in agriculture. Since 
1986, agricultural policy has changed from a centrally planning and autarkic system to an 
open and market-oriented one. In the reform package, the most important components are 
land reform, trade reform, and the development of policy instruments to assist 
agricultural production in general. In addition, the producer price of all commodities was 
liberalized (Hoang Kim Tran, 1994). 
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3.1 DOMESTIC POLICY 
As mentioned in the previous section, the agricultural sector is much less 
protected than other economic sectors in Vietnam. In the domestic agricultural sector, the 
government of Vietnam is concerned with securing agricultural prices, linking 
agricultural production and agro-industries, and raising off-farm activities to reduce 
underemployment in agriculture and rural areas. Details on the land reform and other 
domestic policy components are given in the following sections.  
3.1.1 Land Reform 
The land reform was initiated in 1981. The Directive No. 100 issued on January 
13, 1981 allowed cooperatives to assign parcels of land to farm households based on an 
annual production contract. While the farmers were responsible for planting, weeding, 
and harvesting, the cooperative was in charge of harrowing, ploughing, irrigation and 
drainage, and pest control (Hoang Kim Tran, 1994). Most of the harvest had to be 
delivered to the cooperatives. While cooperatives still acted as a planning agency for 
households’ farming activities, they no longer strictly controlled the sale of products. 
Farmers were allowed to sell their products in free markets provided that they fulfilled 
their production contracts with the cooperatives. This encouraged farmers to increase 
investments in their land resulting in a rise in agricultural output. However, no legal base 
for the transfer of land from cooperatives to households yet existed. 
In 1988, Resolution 10 was launched giving farmers the right to use their land for 
10-15 years, to fully control the production process and to hold about 40% of their 
contracted output.  
However, a turning point was marked in 1993 by the Land Law which granted 
long-term land use rights to farming households as well as the five rights to exchange, 
transfer, lease, inherit, and mortgage. The long-term use rights referred to 20 years when 
the land was used for annual crops, and 50 years in the case of perennial crops. The Land 
Law, however, also put a ceiling on the amount of land that can be allocated to 
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households: for annual crops, the limit is two hectares in the central and northern 
provinces and three hectares in the southern provinces, and for perennials the limit on 
land holdings is ten hectares. 
3.1.2 Input Subsidies 
In the transition process, the state reduced its control and direct intervention in 
production and activities of economic entities. However, indirect policies are designed 
from the state to encourage and facilitate agricultural production. They comprise input 
subsidy policies and general supporting policies. 
 
a.  Seeds and breeds subsidies 
There are many programs in which seeds or breeds are provided to farmers at 
subsidized rates. Many of these programs are conducted at the provincial level and thus 
are difficult to quantify (Barker et al., 2001). At the provincial level, seed subsidies of 
about 20-50% of the seed value have been granted to promote tea production.  
At the national level, the following three programs exist:  
• Program 125 provides VND 10-13 billion every year for the breeding of pigs, 
cows and poultry.  
• Program 225 provides about VND 100 billion. The main ideas of this program are 
to upgrade research institutes which develop crop and animal seeds, to subsidize 
seed import and promote seed multiplication.  
• The last program, the agricultural extension scheme initiated in 1993, provides a 
subsidy of VND 30-50 billion each year. It supports funds for the transfer of new 
technologies into agricultural production. The seed assistance accounts for 60% of 
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the total program funds. According to this scheme, 60% of the seed prices in 
mountainous areas are subsidized, while in plain areas, these are 40%.  
 
b.  Fertilizer and pesticides 
In Vietnam the use of fertilizer grew steadily since 1980. Its consumption 
amounting to 263 kilograms per hectare of cropland in 1999 is very high compared with 
the Asian average consumption of 149 kilograms and a worldwide average of 94 
kilograms. A large part of the fertilizer used has been imported. Fertilizer importers have 
access to subsidized credits (Goletti, 1998, p. 17), and companies that produced fertilizer 
and pesticides can obtain concessional loans as well. Specifically, in the late 1980s, the 
monthly interest rate of loans for working capital in such companies was stipulated to be 
4.65% compared with the normal interest rate of 5.10% and more (Decision No. 73-
NH/QD on May 31, 1989). In 1998, fertilizer SOEs received an interest rate subsidy of 
VND 21.6 billion (Kherallah and Goletti, 2000). 
The question arising is whether farmers actually receive subsidies through 
fertilizer. A simple comparison shows that domestic prices of fertilizer are higher than 
international prices. In case the gap between domestic and border prices is greater than 
transportation costs and marketing margin of the trading companies, the indirect support 
has not trickled down to farmers (Goletti, 1998).  In this study, internal adjustment is 
made to the c.i.f. price of imported fertilizer and the resulting adjusted reference price is 
in some years higher than the retail price prevailing in the Vietnamese market, indicating 
that farmers receive subsidies through fertilizer.  
c. Water fees 
Approximately half of the cultivated land in Vietnam is irrigated. Farmers pay a 
subsidized fee for using water for irrigation. The irrigation fee is set by each province 
under the guidelines of the Ministry of Water Resources. The amount collected accounts 
for 4 to 8% of the normal crop yield (Decree 112/HDBT dated August 25, 1984) and is 
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estimated to be half of the funds needed for providing adequate operation and 
maintenance (Barker et al. 1994). Half of the irrigation maintenance and operation costs 
are subsidized. Irrigation management companies use the collected fees for paying 
salaries to their workers, and for major repairs. In addition, they receive funds from the 
government.  
d. Loan concessions 
The Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development was established in December 
1990. It provides credit with preferential interest rates to farmers who live in 
mountainous areas, on islands or belong to the Khmer minorities. These farmers receive 
credits with an interest rate which is 30% lower than the one being charged to other 
farmers (Decision No. 189/1999/QD-NHNN1 on May 29, 1999). In addition, there are 
other loan concessions like lending to overcome natural disasters. In priority regions like 
rural and mountainous areas, lending interest rates were even below deposit rates in the 
early 1990s (Ngoc Phong Pham, 1992). 
In 1995, the Bank for the Poor was established providing concessional loans to 
poor households with interest rates equal to half of the formal interest rates. In addition to 
government support for interest rate differentials, it freezes or writes off bad debts like 
happened in the processing industry of the sugar sector during the 1990s.  
Farm households growing rubber, for example, also receive loans from 
government programs (poverty reduction program, greening bare land program, etc.). 
Also tea production is promoted at the provincial level by providing loans with 
preferential interest rates and lowering land tax for expansion of tea farms or intensive 
farms. 
e. Electricity  
For electricity used in agricultural production, farmers are charged lower 
subsidized prices than in other sectors. In this study, the electricity subsidy is calculated 
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by the amount of electricity consumed in the agricultural sector multiplied by the price 
difference charged from industrial and agricultural producers. It is about US$ 10 million 
each year.   
To sum up, detailed information on input subsidies of the Vietnamese agricultural 
sector is shown in Figure 10. Total input subsidies become significant since 1995. 
Irrigation subsidy is the most important element, followed by fertilizer subsidy. Fertilizer 
subsidy is, however, unstable changing considerably year by year.  
Figure 10—Input subsidies of the Vietnamese agricultural sector (billion VND) 
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f.  General supporting policies 
These policies aim at facilitating agriculture but differ from input subsidy policies 
in the sense that they cannot be disaggregated for individual commodities. In Vietnam, 
these policies account for 7.2% of total domestic support (ISG, 2001) and include the 
following:  
- science research: during 1996-98, the Vietnamese government spent VND 200-
260 billion per year on scientific research of the agricultural sector.  
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- training: from 1996 to 1998, VND 120-140 billion was spent each year on 
training agricultural technicians, economists, specialists and workers.  
- agricultural infrastructure: every year, the Vietnamese government spends VND 
3,000 billion on building and upgrading irrigation and drainage systems, dams, 
and technical infrastructure of institutes, colleges, etc.  
- food security: stocks of rice and maize are being kept.  
- environmental programs: these receive VND 300 billion from the state budget 
each year.  
3.2 TRADE REFORM AND POLICY  
The trade of agricultural products has been liberalized internally and externally 
since 1986. Since then, all types of goods are allowed to be circulated freely within 
Vietnam. Prices have been deregulated. Business licenses, taxes on agricultural trading 
activities across regions and check points at inter-provincial borders were dismantled. 
Imports and exports from and to Vietnam were affected by the trade reform which 
includes lowering import and export tax and removing non-tariff barriers (decentralizing 
the trading system and removing the restrictions on trading rights) as well as exchange 
rate distortions.  
a.  Price reform 
Before 1986, prices were specified by the state. Input prices of all crop production 
were kept stable to facilitate farmers. The state maintained low retail prices of rice and 
paid for the gap between the retail and farm prices. Then prices based on negotiation 
between sellers and buyers were introduced but still had to follow instructions of the 
state. As a matter of fact, the instructed prices could not follow and reflect fluctuations in 
market demand and supply. In May 1989, prices were allowed to be specified by 
producers and customers. The state no longer intervened directly in agricultural price 
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determination. Nevertheless, the paddy price below the production costs during the time 
of good harvests called for state intervention.  The National Reserve Department was 
required to purchase a great deal of paddy and rice at instructed prices. Decision No. 
137/HDBT on April 27, 1992 of the Council of Ministers marks an important change in 
the price reform process. In this Decision, the state specifies a maximum price of rice in 
focal markets, maximum costs of transporting foods from the South to the North and to 
mountainous areas, maximum price of import urea in foreign currencies, minimum price 
of paddy bought from farmers and minimum export price in foreign currencies. To 
stabilise the market prices of crucial items, the Price Stabilisation Fund was established in 
1993 (Decision No. 151-TTG dated April 12, 1993). Its purposes are (i) to provide funds 
for stockholding of crucial commodities of which foods, important crops and agricultural 
inputs are considered a priority, and (ii) to assist the fund’s contributors whenever 
international or domestic prices experience sharp fluctuations (Circular No. 03/TT-LB on 
May 28, 1993).  
b.  Import and export quotas 
In the past, import and export quotas were important policy measures in Vietnam, 
with goals to ensure food security, to protect SOEs and regulate prices and incomes of 
farmers. The quota was determined twice a year based on demand and supply, seasonal 
conditions and international demand and price (ISG, 2001).  
In 1990, several key agricultural products namely rice, tea, coffee were subject to 
an export quota. Since 1991, however, export quotas have been gradually abolished (Thi 
Bich Loc Tran, 2002). In 1995, export quota on all agricultural commodities but rice 
were ceased (Martin, 2001, p.19). The rice quota amount increased over time, e.g. from 
less than one million metric tons in 1992 to 4.5 million in 1998. In 1999 and 2000, the 
quota remained rather stable at 3.9 million tons, and 4.3 million tons, respectively. In 
2001, the rice export quota was finally abolished, based on Decision No. 
46/2001/QD/TTg, and may be only still used in emergency circumstances.  
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Quantitative restrictions on imports existed for fertilizer, tobacco (Decision No. 
405-TM/XNK, dated April 13, 1993), as well as sugar (1998-2002) and vegetable oil 
(1999-2001). Sugar as well as some types of fertilizer were even subject to temporary 
import prohibition at some stage. 
c. Taxes and tariffs  
Agricultural imports are protected by an average tariff rate of 24%. In the latest 
negotiation to join the WTO, Vietnam committed to lower the average tariff rate to 18%8.  
Also in accordance with the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) 
scheme of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), there is a commitment 
to further reduce tariffs on agricultural imports.  
Import tariffs have been set at 0% for seeds, breeds, animal furs and skin, and 
cotton which are inputs for agricultural and industrial production but unavailable in the 
country. Tariff rates at 1-10% are applied to inputs of the processing industry which 
cannot be found wholly within the country. Tariff rates at 15-30% are applied to 
processed products whose competitiveness is high like meat, milk, fresh vegetables and 
fruit, spice, and semi-processed coffee. The tariff on sugar imports ranges between 30 
and 45%. Higher tariff rates (40-50%) are used for processed products whose 
competitiveness is low like refined vegetable oil, tea, coffee, vegetables, meat and cake, 
breads. Very high tariff rates of 80-100% concern wine, beer, soft drinks, tobacco 
products and luxurious goods whose consumption is discouraged. Within agriculture, 
livestock and cereals are subject to lower import tariffs than industrial crops (Nin et al., 
2003, p. 5).  
                                                 
8 http://www.vnexpress.net/Vietnam/Kinh-doanh/2004/07/3B9D406E/ 
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Table 2—Tariffs on selected agricultural importables 
 
Item Tariff 
Seed and breed, animal furs and skin, and cotton 0% 
Rattan, live animals, maize 5% 
Paddy, sorghum, millet and other cereals, oil seeds, sugar cane 10% 
Meat (fresh or frozen), milk (fresh or skim), cinnamon, ginger, starch 20% 
Vegetables (fresh or frozen), fruit, spices (pepper, chilli, garlic, onion), raw sugar  30% 
Cooking oil, refined sugar 40% 
Processed coffee, tea, sausage and other processed meat, processed vegetables and fruit, cake 
and candy, flour 
50% 
Wine and alcohol, cigarettes  100% 
Source: Decision No. 1803/QD/BTC dated on December 11, 1998. 
Regarding the export tax on agricultural products, there has been a gradual 
removal. According to the Law on Export and Import approved on December 29, 1987 
the export tax on rice, peanut, cashew nut, coffee, tea and rubber was 10%. In 1989, 
export tax rates were reduced to 5% on rice, 4% on rubber and 3% on cashew nut, tea, 
coffee and pepper (Decision No. 222-TC/CTN, December 29, 1989). By now, most 
agricultural exportables are free of tax.  
Table 3—Development of the rice export tax, 1988-2000  
 
 Document Rice with 25% of 
broken and more 
Others 
2000 193/2000/QD/BTC (5/12/2000) 0% 0% 
1998 1336/1998/QD/BTC (05/10/1998) 0% 1% 
1998 1233/1998/QD/BTC (16/9/1998) 1.5% 2% 
1998 805/1998/QD-BTC (25/6/1998) 0% 1% 
1998 103/1998/QD/BTC (6/2/1998) 0% 0% 
1996 684 TC/QD/TCT (9/8/1996) 0% 1% 
1996 542 TC/QD/TCT (12/6/1996) 1% 1% 
1995 QD904TC/TCT/QD (15/08/1995) 2% 2% 
1995 QD615 ATC/TCT/QD (10/06/1995) 1% 1% 
1993 QD571TC/TCT (3/8/1993) 0% 0% 
1992 ND 110-HDBT (31/3/1992) 1% 1% 
1989 Decision 222-TC/CTN (29/12/1989) 5% 5% 
1988 Import-Export Law 10% 10% 
Source: Vietnam Law, available at: www.vietlaw.gov.vn. 
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The taxing of raw exports has been also used for example to promote the 
processing of cashew nut. Thus, in the last ten years, the country has developed its 
processing industry and reduced the share of unprocessed cashew nut in total exports 
impressively.  
Jensen and Tarp (2003) looked at the issue of how reduced trade taxes, as a result 
of a deepening world market integration, affect poverty across different household groups 
in Vietnam. They conclude that rural areas tend to be harder hit than urban areas, and that 
farming households are more affected than wage-earning and self-employed households. 
In addition, they find that rural inhabitants suffer disproportionately from the elimination 
of import tariffs, while the elimination of export taxes has only minor effects.  
Apart from tariffs and taxes, customs surcharges have been applied to 
unprocessed cashew nut, unprocessed rubber latex and coffee. For the export of 
unprocessed cashew nut, a customs surcharge of 10% has been applied since 1995 
(Decision 05/BVGCP-BOG on January 26, 1995), and 5% for the export of rubber latex 
since 2001 (Decision 20/2001/QD-BVGCP, dated March 26, 2001).  
The main idea of customs surcharges is to finance the Price Stabilization Fund 
(PSF) and/or to discourage the import or export of certain commodities. The surcharge is 
calculated based on the difference between domestic market price and the f.o.b. (or c.i.f.) 
price. 
d. Export subsidies 
Before 1998, the Vietnamese government did not award any export subsidies to 
agricultural products (ISG, 2001). In 1998, export subsidies were first provided to canned 
pineapple, and in addition, an Export Reward Fund (ERF) was established. It provided 
financial support and preferential loans to enterprises exporting fruits and vegetables as 
well as meat products. In 1999, the ERF together with the Price Stabilization Fund was 
transformed into the Export Support Fund (ESF). The purposes of the ESF are (i) to 
subsidize interest payments relating to agricultural exportables when their international 
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prices decline, (ii) to assist some exportables which face losses due to their weak 
competitiveness or other reasons, and (iii) to reward exporters who promote new 
exportables or access new foreign markets or enlarge their exports to foreign markets. 
According to ISG (2001), the ESF was used to give interest rate support for purchasing 
rice and pineapple buds as well as exporting certain fruits and vegetables and 
compensating for losses in export for rice and coffee. Since 2001, also tea export has 
been promoted out of this fund. In addition, a subsidy for tea export has been granted by 
some provinces (e.g. Lam-Dong province). 
In 2000, the total amount of subsidies provided by the ESF amounted to US$ 9.2 
million (Schmidt, 2003). More specifically, the export reward has been stipulated as 
follows: those enterprises exporting to new foreign markets and whose revenue exceeded 
US$ 100,000 received a reward amounting to 1% of their export revenue, but not more 
than VND 150 million. Enterprises with (i) an export revenue increasing by 20% 
annually or (ii) high-quality exported commodities which were granted medals at 
international trade fairs, or (iii) enterprises whose inputs were at least 60% domestically 
produced, would be granted an amount of about VND 50-100 million. In 2001, the 
reward policy was changed. The reward is now determined by the annual increase of the 
export revenue.  
In the latest document submitted to the WTO, Vietnam committed itself to cease 
export subsidies for coffee on the date it joins WTO, and for rice, pork and vegetables in 
three years after having entered WTO9.  
e.  Removing trading licenses 
Before 1989, the state held the monopoly position in foreign trade (Circular No. 
53-BNG/VP dated October 2, 1982). The Ministry of Foreign Trade established Import 
and Export Companies, and only these companies were allowed to trade. Major partners 
were the FSU and CEECs. During 1981-88, foreign trade was decentralized. As a result 
                                                 
9 http://www.vnexpress.net/Vietnam/Kinh-doanh/2004/07/3B9D406E/. 
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not only import and export companies which belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
were allowed to import and export, but also those belonging to other Ministries or local 
governments (Thi Mo Nguyen et al., 1996).  
In 1989, the monopoly of the SOEs was broken. Private trading companies were 
allowed to engage in trade but their activities were severely impeded because import and 
export licenses were required. Private companies that produced exportables were allowed 
to choose state-owned exporting companies as export entrustees while those with annual 
export revenues above US$ 5 million could apply for export licenses (Circular No. 10-
KTDN/XNK dated August 7, 1989). Since 1991, all private companies with licences 
were allowed to export directly, not through entrustees. In 1998, the licensing 
requirements for trading were largely abolished, and since 2001, private companies as 
well as SOEs are allowed to export most products without any licence. In agriculture, 
export licenses are now applied only to seeds, breeds, and all kinds of insects and import 
licenses on raw and refined sugar as well as alcohol (Decree 57/1998/ND-CP, dated on 
July 31, 1998). Nevertheless, the export of important agricultural commodities like rice, 
coffee, rubber, tea largely remains in the hands of SOEs (Auffret, 2003). 
f.  Other non-tariff trade barriers 
Decree No. 92/CP on November 27, 1993 on plant protection and quarantine and 
Decree No. 93/CP dated November 27, 1993 on veterinary issues stipulated that harmful 
plants or animals should be inspected when being imported, exported or transited through 
the country. However, the implementation of existing regulations on pest and disease 
control of Vietnam which are said to be in conformity with WTO, has been ineffective 
(ISG, 2001, p. 19).  
In the latest negotiation to join the WTO in June 2004, Vietnam committed itself 
to implement the SPS agreement on the date of joining the WTO except in three areas, 
namely harmonization, equivalence, and control, inspection and approval procedures for 
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which it wants a transition period of about three years10. This is argued on the basis of 
lacking resources to implement immediately and the complexity of the three issues. 
g.  Removing exchange rate distortions 
Until March 1989, the exchange rate had been fixed, and it served as an 
accounting measure rather than a policy indicator reflecting economic fundamentals. 
During the years of super inflation (1986-88), the Vietnamese Dong became overvalued, 
as indicated by the fact that the official exchange rate was much lower than that 
prevailing in the parallel market. Hence, from 1989 to 1991, the local currency was 
depreciated several times based on inflation rates, interest rates, balance of payments 
stance and the exchange rate in the parallel market. These depreciations increased the 
competitiveness of Vietnamese goods and improved export and the current account (Tri 
Thanh Vo et al., 2000, pp. x-xi).  
Between 1991 and 1997, the exchange rate was kept rather stable by strict 
controls over the capital account, especially over capital outflows. In 1997, the 
Vietnamese Dong was depreciated again due to the balance of payments pressures 
resulting from declined foreign direct investment inflows and export values due to the 
Asian financial crisis. The exchange rate band was widened from 1% to 5% in February 
1997 and to 10% in October 1997. Since February 1999, the exchange rate has been 
specified daily by the average of inter-bank exchange rates from transactions in the 
previous days with a narrow band of 0.1% (Ohno, 2003). This makes the exchange rate 
policy in Vietnam some kind of crawling peg one.   
3.3 TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Since 1991, Vietnam has increasingly strengthened its diplomatic relations with 
other countries in the quest for further integration. Up to now, Vietnam has signed trade 
agreements with around 76 countries.  
                                                 
10 http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news04_e/acc_vietnam_15june04_e.htm. 
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Vietnam signed the Bali Treaty of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) in 1992, and became a full member on July 28, 1995. It also joined Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in November, 1998. As a member of the ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), Vietnam is to achieve a tariff range of 0 to 5 % by 2006 
for goods imported from other ASEAN countries and to eliminate non-tariff trade 
barriers.  
A Framework Cooperation Agreement (OJ L 136/28 of 07.06.1996) was signed 
between the EC and Vietnam in July 1995 and entered into force on 1 June 1996. The 
Agreement was concluded for an initial five-year duration with a clause providing for an 
automatic extension on a yearly basis. It especially aims at increasing bilateral trade and 
investment, support for a sustainable economic development and an improvement of the 
living conditions of the poor. The EU traditionally absorbs about 22% of Vietnam’s 
exports (€ 1.47 billion in 2001) and is the country's largest trading partner. The EU 
supplies only 12% of Vietnam's imports (EU-website, 2004). 
In February 1994, the US lifted their trade embargo against Vietnam which had 
been in place since the US involvement in the Vietnam war. On 13 July 2000, the US-
Vietnamese Trade Agreement was signed, and it became legally effective on 10 
December 2001. According to the World Bank, the agreement will increase Vietnam’s 
exports by US$ 1 billion within 4 years (Reuters, 2001). Until the signing of the 
agreement, Vietnam was one of the few countries on which the US had imposed general 
tariffs which were generally much higher than the normal trading status tariffs. 
According to a World Bank study (Fukase and Martin, 1999), the agreement helped to 
almost double Vietnam’s annual exports to the US.  
In early 2001, a trade agreement was signed between Vietnam and Pakistan. 
Furthermore, Vietnamese officials recently completed negotiations with India concerning 
trade regulations and tariffs.  
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On 4 November 2002, China and the ASEAN countries signed a Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, marking the formal launch of the 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). In a first stage, tariffs will be reduced or 
eliminated in 2010 for ASEAN-6 and in 2015 for the newer ASEAN countries including 
Vietnam (Bridges, 2003).  
Roland-Holst et al. (2002) assess the long-term effects (2000-2020) of Vietnam’s 
deepening integration into the world markets. They conclude that most benefits accrue to 
Vietnam when it participates in various bilateral, regional and multilateral trade 
agreements and at the same time allowing for extensive capital market liberalization, 
promoting FDI and proceeding with the domestic reform process.  
 
4. ESTIMATING PROTECTION IN VIETNAM 
After having described the general situation and policy in the agricultural sector, 
the estimates of the MPS and PSEs are presented for individual commodities in Vietnam. 
After a literature review, the methodology and data sources are briefly described. Then, 
the commodity-specific results on MPS and PSEs in Vietnam are analyzed. Based on this 
analysis, further research needs are discussed.  
The selected agricultural commodities include rice, coffee, tea, rubber, pepper, 
sugar, groundnut, cashew nut and pig meat. These commodities are the main agricultural 
products and exportables of Vietnam. Their shares in total output exceed 70% allowing 
for a generalization of the calculated PSEs, thus roughly presenting the whole agricultural 
sector.  
In order to estimate agricultural producer support, input subsidies and price-based 
measures, namely export subsidies and taxes, as well as tariff and non-tariff barriers are 
taken into account. General support is not considered in the quantification of PSEs. The 
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exchange rate used in converting reference prices into the domestic currency is the 
nominal average rate. This is in accordance with other studies.  
Not many studies exist on the analysis of agricultural support in Vietnam. 
Nominal rates of protection (NPR) and effective rates of protection (EPR) have been 
calculated for selected agricultural commodities in Vietnam by FAO (Barker et al., 
1994), GSO (1999) and IFPRI (Barker et al., 2001). Barker et al. (1994) calculated NPRs 
for rice and urea, i.e. the main agricultural output and input in Vietnam. In 2001, they 
expanded their calculations of NPRs also to rubber, coffee, pepper, and tobacco during 
the 1985-2000 period (Barker et al., 2001). The NPRs referred to a comparison of retail 
and border prices without any adjustments. GSO (1997) calculated EPRs for the year 
1996 for 97 items, including 6 agricultural commodities, namely paddy/grain, rubber, 
coffee, sugarcane, pig, and poultry. A reference to these studies and a comparison of their 
results with own calculations is incorporated in the respective subsections for individual 
commodities.  
4.1 METHODOLOGY 
This study adopts the OECD methodology in calculating PSEs for major 
agricultural products of Vietnam. A detailed description of the basic methodology has 
been provided by Mullen et al. (2004). In their paper published by IFPRI, they highlight 
the methodological issues which need to be considered when calculating PSEs, 
specifically in the context of developing countries.   
Assumptions employed in the analysis include competitive markets and a small 
country (or price taker) in the international market under study. According to OECD 
(Portugal, 2002), PSEs imply gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to 
agricultural producers. These gross transfers result from different policy actions and are 
measured as the difference between the farm-gate and the equivalent international price, 
plus budgetary payments. PSEs can be measured for specific commodities or for the 
whole agricultural sector. They consist of the following eight components: i) market price 
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support (MPS), and budgetary payments based on ii) output, iii) area planted/animal 
numbers, iv) historical entitlements, v) input used, vi) input constraints, vii) overall 
farming income, and viii) miscellaneous payments. Both, MPS and PSEs, can be denoted 
in monetary terms or as percentage of the agricultural output value and budgetary 
support. 
MPS refers to transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers as 
a result of policy measures that create a gap between border prices and domestic prices. 
They are measured at the farm-gate level, for a specific agricultural commodity. The 
comparison of developed and developing countries shows that in the latter MPS is used 
more often than payment measures (Mullen et al., 2004). This is because of the limited 
budget of developing countries, which restricts payments.  
To compare with the domestic farm-gate price, reference prices are adjusted for 
costs arising in conveying the commodity from the farm to the port. If the commodity i is 
an importable, the reference price (Pr) can be taken from the c.i.f. price (Pcif) at the port of 
the country under consideration or the f.o.b. price from the main exporter plus 
international freight and insurance from the exporter to the home country’s port. If 
commodity i is an exportable, the reference price (Pr) can be deducted from the f.o.b. 
price (Pfob) at the home country’s port or the c.i.f. price at the main importer’s port minus 
international freight and insurance to that importer’s port. As agricultural exportable and 
importable are involved with transportation costs, marketing costs and export-import fees 
during the transition stage from the farm to the port, these c.i.f. and f.o.b. prices should be 
adjusted in order to be comparable with the farm-gate price:  
(1)   Par = Pcif + Cp + Tp:w + Mp:w - Tw:f – Mw:f - Qadj    (for importables) 
(2) Par = Pfob - Cp - Tp:w - Mp:w - Tw:f - Mw:f - Qadj     (for exportables) 
where Par means adjusted reference prices, Cp denotes port charges and Tp:w and Tw:f 
represent transportation and handling costs from the port to the domestic wholesale 
market and from the wholesale market to the farm. Mp:w and Mw:f, respectively, refer to 
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marketing margins of trading companies from the port to the wholesale market and from 
the wholesale market to the farm. Qadj means the unit price difference between an 
exportable (or importable) and the equivalent domestically consumed commodity due to 
a quality difference. In developing countries, these adjustments may be quite significant. 
Transportation costs and marketing margin are high because of poor quality 
infrastructure. The quality difference may be great since better quality products are likely 
to be chosen for export, and importables may have better quality than domestic products 
due to the lower level of domestic technology.  
In monetary term, MPS of an agricultural commodity i equals: 
(3) MPSi = (Pdi - Pari) · Qi 
where Par, Pd and Q represent the adjusted reference price, farm-gate price and quantity 
produced of the agricultural commodity i. 
In relative form to the value of output at adjusted international prices, MPS is 
equal to:  
(4)   
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ar
ii
ar
i
di
QP
QPP
MPS ⋅
⋅−= )(%  
Having calculated the MPS for individual commodities, it is necessary to 
extrapolate for the whole agricultural sector to provide an overall measure. Ideally, if 
MPS is computed for all agricultural commodities, the nominal MPS of the agricultural 
sector will be equal to the sum of all nominal MPS calculated. Normally, due to limited 
resources, the MPS is calculated only for the most important commodities. The nominal 
MPS of included commodities will be extrapolated to the whole agricultural sector in one 
of the two following ways:  
1. Summing up the nominal MPS of the included commodities. This is symbolized 
by MPSc. It is assumed that the MPS for the excluded commodities is zero. This 
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makes sense as commodities subject to policy intervention are usually selected 
first for the analysis and calculation of MPS.  
2. “Scaling up” nominal MPS for the whole agricultural sector, which is called MPS, 
by using the output share of the included commodities in total agricultural 
production. It is assumed that the protection of the included commodities is 
comparable to that of the excluded commodities. To reduce errors in this scaling-
up stage, it is suggested that the total value of included commodities should cover 
at least 70% of the total agricultural production value (Portugal, 2002, p. 17).  
Based on the nominal MPS for the whole agricultural sector, the nominal PSE can 
be obtained by summing up the nominal MPS and the budgetary payments. 
Corresponding to the way of estimating the nominal MPS for the agricultural sector, the 
nominal PSE can be the sum of the budgetary payments and total MPS of the included 
commodities, PSEc, or the sum of the budgetary payments and the scaled up value of total 
MPS of the included commodities, PSE (see Mullen et al. (2004) for further discussion).  
In general, PSE is estimated for the agricultural sector. In cases the budgetary 
payments can be separated for individual agricultural commodities, PSE can be estimated 
for individual commodities.  
Algebraically, PSEs can be measured as:  
(5) PSEc = MPSc + PP  ; PSE = MPS + PP 
(6) 100% ⋅+⋅= PPQP
PSE
PSE
d
c
c  ; 100% ⋅+⋅= PPQP
PSEPSE
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where PP implies budgetary payments and subsidies to agricultural producers (Portugal, 
2002). The %PSE is usually measured, with domestic prices in the denominator, as 
shown in equation (6). 
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Since the %PSE above contains the agricultural production value measured with 
the farm price, it gives higher (lower) weights for protected (disprotected) commodities 
in the denominator (Pursell and Gupta, 1997). Methodologically, this downward 
(upward) bias in the %PSE can be overcome by valuing agricultural output at farm-
equivalent international prices, which Mullen et al. (2004) call the trade economist 
approach. Difficulties and measurement errors in valuing agricultural output at farm-
equivalent international prices make this approach used less frequently. 
In large developing countries, a regional analysis may be relevant. This is the case 
when policies may result in the protection of one region and disprotection of another. For 
instance, an export subsidy policy may give support to farmers in the region near the port, 
while farmers in the region far from the port may not benefit if domestic trade limitation 
hinders their products to be exported. In another case, when a region has a surplus of an 
agricultural commodity but another region has a deficit, farm prices in the deficit region 
will have to be compared either with the adjusted c.i.f. price or with the adjusted price of 
that commodity from the surplus region, depending on which price is lower. In case of 
Indian wheat, e.g. the farm price in the deficit region was compared with the adjusted 
price from the surplus region (Pursell and Gupta, 1997). If policy ensures that domestic 
markets are well integrated, the regional price difference will merely reflect 
transportation and marketing costs between regions under investigation.  
A farm-gate price can depict an annual average as in case of the OECD studies or 
an average price during the seasons when most agricultural harvesting takes place 
(Pursell and Gupta, 1997, p. xii). The average price of agricultural commodities during 
harvest time, in case it is available, will give more accurate results than the annual 
average price because the latter not only reflects the value of the product but also 
includes storage costs. 
Another issue of concern in calculating PSEs is the use of the exchange rate. The 
exchange rate is exerted in converting the border (reference) price into local currency to 
be comparable with the farm price. Most studies utilize the nominal exchange rate. This 
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is because of the computational convenience and this holds true when the nominal 
exchange rate is correctly specified. In case that the exchange rate is misaligned which 
has characterised some developing countries using the nominal exchange rate may give 
results for those conditions. But the nominal exchange rate in that case does not reflect 
the competitiveness of tradable goods. One way to overcome this is to use of the real 
(inflation-adjusted) exchange rate or purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate. 
Alternatively, an equilibrium exchange rate can be calculated (Cheng and Orden, 2004). 
4.2 DATA SOURCES 
Regarding our calculation of MPS for specific commodities, border prices are unit 
values of exports or imports of agricultural products. These are computed from annual 
export values and export volumes of individual agricultural commodities taken from 
FAO database.  
Domestic prices of agricultural commodities are producer (or farm) prices, taken 
from the Department of Trade and Prices of the General Statistic Office of Vietnam for 
the 1986-2003 period. Domestic prices are annual average prices.  
Data on production output of paddy rice, coffee, tea, groundnut, rubber, pepper, 
sugarcane, and cotton are from the Statistical Yearbook of the General Statistic Office of 
Vietnam (various years), of cashew nut from the Institute for Agricultural Economics and 
of pig meat from the FAO database. Data on agricultural value is also from the Statistical 
Yearbook of the General Statistic Office of Vietnam (various years). 
Transportation costs, port charges and marketing margins of import and/or export 
enterprises as well as the quality difference between domestically produced commodities 
and corresponding exportables or importables are derived from various existing studies. 
For example, adjustments of prices for rice and sugar have been made based on study 
results by Xuan Nguyen Nguyen et al. (1995), Trung Que Nguyen et al. (1997) and 
Khiem et al. (1996). Quality adjustments for rice have been made especially based on 
information from Goletti et al. (1997). Data on the quality of exported rice is provided by 
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the Ministry of Trade each year, while the information on the quality of domestically 
consumed rice for the year 2000 is based on a study of the Institute for Agricultural 
Economics (2001). More details on data sources are given in the subsections for the 
individual commodities. A detailed overview of the adjustment factors and their 
respective sources are given in Appendix Table 3. Exchange rates are annual average 
rates obtained from the International Financial Statistics 2003 (IMF).  
Budgetary payments include basically input subsidies like (i) irrigation fee, (ii) 
seed subsidy, (iii) electricity used in agricultural production, (iv) fertilizer subsidy and (v) 
credit subsidy. Irrigation fee is taken from the Department of Irrigation while information 
on the seed subsidy is from the Department of Agriculture of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development (MARD). Electricity used in agricultural production is provided 
by the Institute of Energy (Electricity of Vietnam). Fertilizer subsidy is calculated based 
on the amount of fertilizer utilized taken from the GSO and the difference between the 
adjusted border price and retail price of fertilizer gathered from the GSO and Informatic 
Center for Agriculture and Rural Development of MARD. The credit subsidy is 
computed using data on credit of the Bank for the Poor.  
There are three problems encountered in calculating input subsidies. First, 
electricity subsidy is computed by the amount of electricity provided for agriculture 
multiplied by the difference between the prices charged from the agricultural and the 
industrial sectors. This provides a rough estimation of subsidies provided to farmers as 
compared with enterprises. Ideally, the electricity subsidy must be the difference between 
the price charged to the agricultural sector and the price fully reflecting depreciation and 
operational costs in the electricity sector. Second, fertilizer subsidy is calculated by the 
product of the fertilizer quantity and the gap between the retail price in the Vietnamese 
market and the adjusted c.i.f price of urea. The quantity of fertilizer is the sum of 
imported fertilizer and domestically produced fertilizer quantities, and it is assumed that 
annual changes in stock are minor or negligible. In addition, the price gap is measured for 
urea, while the quantity of fertilizer is the sum of quantities of different kinds of fertilizer. 
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Hence, it is supposed that the price gap of urea also holds with other kinds of fertilizer. 
Third, credit subsidy includes credits of the Bank for the Poor and does not take into 
account the preferential credit to minorities of the Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development. It is assumed that this may not change the result significantly, as the 
amount of lending to minorities is small and subsidies were just 30% of the normal rates. 
4.3 MARKET PRICE SUPPORT FOR MAJOR AGRICULTURAL 
COMMODITIES 
Based on the above mentioned methodology, the protection is calculated for the 
individual major agricultural commodities in the following subsections. The estimation of 
the adjusted reference prices for the individual commodities is generally based on 
equations (1) and (2), while the %MPS calculation derives from equation (4).  
a. Rice 
To calculate the %MPS for rice, paddy prices (Pf) are first converted into rice 
prices (Pd) and then compared with the adjusted reference prices. According to Xuan 
Nguyen Nguyen et al. (1995), the paddy price accounts for 73.5% of the milled price. 
The conversion factor is 1.43 (=1/0.7) as each kilogram of paddy gives 0.7 kilogram of 
rice. The price of the rice, Pd, converted from the paddy price, Pf, can be thus calculated 
as:  
Pd = (Pf /0.735) · 1.43 
In order to obtain the adjusted reference price of rice, the export price of rice is 
first adjusted to the quality difference between the exported and domestically consumed 
rice, and then to the transportation and handling costs as well as to the marketing margin 
of the exporting company.  
Quality adjustment 
An adjustment with respect to the quality difference is necessary in order to 
compare domestic with adjusted export prices. Since the quality of domestically 
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consumed and exported rice changes over time, a quality index is needed which can then 
be used to weigh the respective domestic and export prices.  
For domestically consumed rice, the Institute for Agricultural Economics (IAE, 
2001) calculated an average quality index, based on their own survey results. For the year 
2000, this index amounts to 1.68 (Table 4).  
For the exported rice, a quality index has to be constructed, as will be described 
step by step in the following: first, it is known that domestically consumed rice in 
Vietnam is categorized in three groups:  
(i) high quality rice (less than 10% broken; short time of storage; fragrant rice);  
(ii) medium quality rice (above 10% broken); and 
(iii) low quality (very high percentage of broken rice, moldy, long storage time).  
According to international standards, however, rice is categorized in the following three 
groups:  
(a) high quality rice (with no more than 10% broken),  
(b) medium quality (15-20% broken), and  
(c) low quality (more than 20% broken).  
Thus, the Vietnamese medium quality domestic rice (ii) corresponds most closely to the 
category of low quality exported rice (c).  
Second, the Institute for Agricultural Economics (IAE, 2001) has assigned a 
factor of 1 to the low quality domestic rice (iii), 1.4 to the medium quality rice (ii) and 
2.9 to the high quality domestic rice (i). Hence, a factor of 1.4 is attached to the low 
quality export rice (c). However, also the factors for the other two export quality 
categories (a,b) are needed to calculate the quality index for exported rice. 
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Since it is known that the price of high quality export rice is 35% higher (=1.35) 
and that of medium quality export rice is 25% (=1.25) higher than the price of low quality 
export rice, the factors for these respective export rice categories can be calculated by 
multiplying the price difference with the factor 1.4. Hence, for the high and medium 
quality export rice, the factors 1.89 (i.e. 1.35*1.4), and 1.75 (i.e. 1.25*1.4), respectively 
are derived. By multiplying these factors with the amounts of different shares of export 
rice qualities, as represented in Table 4, a quality index of 1.73 for exported rice has been 
calculated.  
Table 4—Quality of rice in Vietnam in 2000 
 
 Share in total of 
each category 
Quality index of 
each category 
Quality index 
of total 
Domestic rice    1.68 
Exported rice    1.73 
By quality category (based on % of broken rice) 
• 10% and less broken 49 1.89 0.93 
• 15-20%  26 1.75 0.45 
• more than 20%  25 1.4 0.35 
Sources: IAE (2001), Institute for Trade Research (2001) and own calculation. 
Dividing the quality index of exported rice in 2000 by the quality index of 
domestically consumed rice in the corresponding year gives the rate of 1.03. This means 
that the quality of exported rice is 3% higher than the quality of domestically consumed 
rice. It is assumed that this quality difference holds for the whole 1986-2002 period. 
Adjustment for other factors 
The adjustment for the handling costs and the marketing margin of rice exports is 
based on Xuan Nguyen Nguyen et al. (1995). They estimate the port charges, 
transportation and handling costs from the exporting companies to the port to be 9.3% of 
the export price, and the marketing margins of the exporting companies to be 9.8%. This 
assumption on the marketing margin is supported by other studies: Khiem et al. (1996) as 
quoted in Young et al. (2002, p. 20), estimate packaging costs of rice exporters in the 
Mekong Delta to account for about 3%, while profits of exporting companies are 5.6% of 
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the export price. According to Trung Que Nguyen et al. (1997) advertisement and trade 
fair costs range from 0.1% to 1.5% of the export price. Hence, based on this, the total 
marketing margin is within 8.7-10.1% of the export price. Using the estimates of Xuan 
Nguyen Nguyen et al. (1995), the adjusted reference price calculated in the following 
equation (2) is:  
Par = Pr · (1-0.093-0.098) - 0.03 · Pr · (1-0.093-0.098) 
The %MPS for rice in Vietnam shows that rice farmers have been protected 
especially at the end of the eighties and after 1996, while from 1990 to the mid-nineties, 
they were taxed (Figure 11). At the beginning of the reform process, between 1987 and 
1989, the extremely positive %MPS was due to super inflation and an overvalued 
exchange rate. Super inflation resulted in high domestic prices for rice. At the same time, 
export prices were low when being converted into the local currency, due to an 
overvalued exchange rate (see subsection 3.2g). As such, there is a great and positive gap 
between farm and adjusted reference prices, and the resulting positive and significant 
%MPS. This outcome holds for other commodities as well. The negative %MPS in the 
early 1990s, can be attributed to the small exporting quota. During these years, the annual 
export quota of rice was kept at a low level, being not more than two million tons. The 
small quota made rice more abundant in domestic markets and lowered its domestic 
price.  
Due to the liberalization of the rice market and the minimum price policy 
launched in 1993, the producer prices rose in all regions but especially in the south where 
the implicit tax of the export quota had mostly depressed prices. This trend was further 
increased by public stockholding and the increased export quota. These policies increase 
the demand for rice thus pushing up domestic prices. As a matter of fact, the significant 
increase in the export volume since 1996 correlates well with the sharp increase in the 
domestic price. On the other hand, the lack of competition in the allocation of the export 
quota and the export subsidy policy might contribute to the fact that STEs maintained low 
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export prices. The %MPS for rice keeps increasing and becomes positive since the mid 
1990s. 
Figure 11—MPS and NPC for rice, 1985-2002 
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Source: Barker et al. (2001) and own calculations.  
Our estimates are supported by the results of a study by GSO (1999). They 
calculated an effective rate of protection of 0.127 for 1996, indicating a slight protection 
of rice farmers in that year. Similarly, Barker et al. (1994) found that the retail price of 
rice was about 10% lower than the Hochiminh f.o.b prices at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Their estimated ratios of retail prices to Hochiminh f.o.b. prices were 0.94 (1991) and 
0.86 (1992), respectively. According to them, the gap can be mainly attributed to the 
monopoly position of public trading firms.  
In 2001, results from an IFPRI study by Barker et al. (2001) also indicated 
negative nominal and effective protection rates for major agricultural products including 
rice. They showed that rice was disprotected during the 1985-2000 period while our 
estimates indicate an increase in protection since 1996. 
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Similarly, Manh Hai Nguyen and Heidhues (2004) report that Vietnamese rice 
farmers are taxed by about 8%, as their nominal protection coefficient for rice is 0.919 in 
1998. Their result derived from a comparison between the domestic price of rice in 
Angiang province and the social price of rice in 1999. Since Angiang is the largest rice 
producing province, and the second largest rice-exporting province, the data of Angiang 
can well represent the prevailing price in the country. However, internal adjustments 
between exported and domestically consumed rice are not incorporated in their 
calculations. Similarly, if we compare domestic and border prices, we also find 
disprotection until 1999.  
Opposed to our own estimates, all these studies do not take into account the 
quality difference of exported and domestically consumed rice, transportation costs and 
marketing margins of trading companies. This comparison implies that the quality 
difference and internal adjustments are important for the calculation and interpretation of 
the rice %MPS. Ignoring these factors in developing countries may lead to misleading 
results. 
b.  Coffee 
Before 1990, coffee export prices were fixed for several years, and did not follow 
the international market price. Export prices did not encourage coffee planting, they even 
discouraged it (Thi Bich Loc Tran, 2002, p. 64). Since 1991, export prices have been 
specified on the basis of international prices. 
The %MPS for coffee is calculated by using farm prices and border prices. Farm 
prices are annual averages, provided by the GSO. 80% of coffee export is processed 
(shelled) by farmers. Private assemblers sort and transport the coffee, and then sell it to 
exporting companies. The remaining 20% of the coffee is processed and then exported by 
exporting companies. Trung Que Nguyen et al. (1997) found that transportation and 
sorting costs, as well as profits of private assemblers account for 30% of the selling 
prices, while an exporting company earns a profit of 4% of the export prices, and spends 
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10% of the f.o.b. prices on packaging, handling, transportation, and marketing costs. The 
adjusted reference price of coffee is thus equal to:  
   Par = (1-0.04-0.1) · Pr · (1-0.3) 
The coffee %MPS shows that coffee farmers were protected between 1991 and 
1993, disprotected during 1994-98, and protected again in 1999 and 2000 (Figure 12). 
Liberalisation of coffee trade between 1991 and 1993 resulted in higher domestic prices 
as compared to adjusted reference prices. Before 1990, there were three exporters, all 
belonging to the Coffee Export Corporation and they exported coffee mainly to Russia 
and Eastern European countries.  In the early 1990s, many companies competed in 
buying and exporting coffee pushing domestic prices for coffee up sharply. In response to 
this competition, the government launched the focal exporter policy for 1994-1998: those 
members of the Coffee and Cacao Association whose annual export volume was above 
200 tons were accepted as focal exporters and could export without any quantitative 
restrictions. This policy gave market power to the focal exporters and led to lower farm 
prices and disprotection over farmers during 1994-98. The positive %MPS in 1999 and 
2000 may be the result of the export promotion policy, namely export rewards and credit 
support for coffee exports, and the public stockholding policy (in Decision 1067/QD-TTg 
dated October 27, 2000, Document on January 11, 2001).  
This result differs from Barker et al. (2001) where coffee is considered to be 
systematically disprotected as domestic retail prices of coffee are systematically lower 
than exporting prices. The difference between our estimations and Barker’s et al. results 
highlights the role of internal adjustment made to the border price.  
According to GSO (1999), the effective rate of protection for coffee in 1996 is 
0.683. Coffee is effectively protected as production inputs are taken into account. As a 
matter of fact, coffee production has been supported by credit and fertilizer subsidies. 
These input subsidies have not been captured in the %MPS estimation for coffee and 
therefore generated a gap between our results and those by GSO.  
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  Figure 12—MPS and NPC for coffee, 1985-2000 
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Source: Barker et al. (2001) and own calculations.  
c. Tea 
Farm prices for tea are equivalent to the prices of dried buds of tea which are 
mainly used for export. Hence, the MPS can be measured by adjusting the reference price 
for the transportation and marketing costs of exporting companies. According to Le Van 
Dien (1990), transportation costs were 3.6%, and the profit amounted to 0.5% of export 
prices. The adjusted reference price is:  
   Par = Pr · (1 - 0.036 – 0.005) 
The tea %MPS is significantly positive in 1988, during 1993-95 and 1999-2001 
(Figure 13). In 1988, super inflation and an overvalued exchange rate resulted - after 
being converted into the Vietnamese Dong - in international tea prices which were much 
lower than the domestic price. Between 1993-1995, tea was mainly exported by the 
Vietnam Tea Corporation (VINATEA). The limited marketing capability of VINATEA 
which stemmed largely from its monopoly position resulted in low export prices. 
Although there have been no constraints on tea export since 1991, private companies 
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started to participate in the tea exporting business only recently. During 1999-2001, 
export rewards and local export support policies may have been the reason for the lower 
adjusted reference price as compared with the domestic producer price. 
Figure 13—MPS for tea, 1986-2002 
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Source: Own calculations. 
d. Cashew nut 
Farm prices and unit values of cashew nut exports are used for the MPS 
calculation. Since farm prices represent prices of unprocessed cashew nut, the unit values 
need to be converted into unprocessed cashew nut. For this calculation, the following 
information is to be taken into account: first, every five kilograms of unprocessed cashew 
nut give one kilogram of processed cashew nut. Second, the processing costs and 
marketing costs account for 23% of unprocessed cashew nut costs and export profits are 
26% of unprocessed cashew nut costs (Trung Que Nguyen et al. (2002)). And third, 
Vietnam exports both unprocessed and processed cashew nuts and their shares in export 
volume changed considerably over time. Specifically, during 1990-92, unprocessed and 
processed cashew nut accounted for 90% and 10% of the export volume, respectively. 
Hence, the unit value of one kilogram of unprocessed cashew nut is computed from the 
following equation:  
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Pr = 0.9·Punprocess+ 0.1·Pprocess = 0.9·Punprocess + 0.1·5·1.49·Punprocess = 1.645·Punprocess 
Between 1993 and 1995, processed and unprocessed cashew nut accounted for 
50% of export volume each. The unit value of one kilogram of unprocessed cashew nut 
export, Punprocess, is derived from:  
Pr = 0.5·Punprocess+ 0.5·Pprocess = 0.5·Punprocess + 0.5·5·1.49·Punprocess = 4.225·Punprocess 
From 1996 to 2002, 90% of cashew nut exports were processed and only 10% 
were unprocessed. The unit value of unprocessed export is derived from the following 
equation:  
Pr = 0.1·Punprocess+0.9·Pprocess = 0.1·Punprocess + 0.9·5·1.49·Punprocess = 6.805·Punprocess 
Having unit values of unprocessed exports, adjustment for transportation from the 
farm to processing and exporting companies is needed. According to Trung Que Nguyen 
et al. (2002), transportation costs and marketing margins of private assemblers who 
mainly transport unprocessed cashew nut from the farm to processing and exporting 
companies, amount to 0.8% of the selling price. The reference price of unprocessed 
cashew nut at the farm gate level therefore equals:  
Par = (1 - 0.008) · Punprocess 
Using this reference price for comparison with farm prices, the %MPS for 
unprocessed cashew nut shows relatively strong fluctuations since 1990 (Figure 14). 
Between 1990 and 1992, there was disprotection over farmers growing cashew nut, 
beyond the export tax of 3-4% on cashew nut. The disprotection is due to different 
reasons. Before the Land Law of 1993, the long term using right of land was not 
accepted, the plantation of cashew nut was in small scale and dispersed. STEs kept 
monopoly positions in trading and did not regard cashew nut as an important exportable. 
The limited volume of export orders found by STEs lowered the farm price of cashew 
nut. In 1993-95, the farmers were protected. In this time period, many processing 
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factories came into operation raising the demand for (and price of) unprocessed cashew 
nut from farmers (IAPP, 1997). This fact favours farmers at the expense of traders. In 
addition, given low export prices, the processing and trading companies were sustainable 
partly due to tax exemption applied to companies just coming into operation (Circular 
No. 128/2003/TT-BTC on December 22, 2003). This subsidy is not included in the 
calculations, but allowed the gap between the farm and adjusted reference prices to 
increase. Since 1996, there is neither protection nor disprotection over farmers. This 
seems to fit to the fact that cashew nut has not been subject to much policy intervention 
due to its remaining small, though recently increasing, share in total agricultural export 
revenue.  
 Figure 14—MPS for cashew nut, 1990-2002 
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  Source: Own calculations.  
e.  Groundnut 
The %MPS for groundnut is based on farm prices and adjusted unit values of 
groundnut export. Farm prices are prices of unshelled nut, provided by GSO. Private 
assemblers buy unshelled groundnut of farmers and sell it to processing entities. 
Processing entities husk, classify and pack the groundnut and sell it to exporting 
companies. According to Trung Que Nguyen et al. (1997), private assemblers pay 1.5% 
of the selling price for transportation costs, and receive a profit of 0.9% of their selling 
price. Processors pay 2% of total revenue for operation costs and earn 1% of total 
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revenue as their profit. Shelled groundnut accounts for 89% of total revenue (the 
remaining 11% are by-products). It also has to be known that one kilogram of unshelled 
groundnut just gives about 0.7 kilogram of shelled groundnut. Exporting companies pay 
8.5% of exporting prices for transportation, operation and marketing and get 2.5% of 
exporting prices as their profit. The adjusted reference price at the farm-gate level is:  
Par = (Pr · (1-0.085-0.025)/0.89) · (1-0.01-0.02) · 0.7 · (1-0.015-0.009) 
After a decrease in disprotection in the 1990s, the recent %MPS for groundnut 
does not display a clear trend (Figure 15). Only since 1997, has the %MPS turned out to 
be positive, but the magnitude of it is small. Hence, it does not seem likely that groundnut 
is protected even between 1997 and 2001. Similar to cashew nut, export of groundnut has 
not received much policy attention due to its small share in total agricultural export 
revenue. According to Thi Nhieu Nguyen et al. (1994), export of groundnut is mainly to 
provide employment and income for farmers. 
Figure 15—MPS for shelled groundnut, 1986-2002 
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Source: Own calculation 
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f.  Rubber 
Farm prices are prices for dry latex rubber which is also the main rubber exported 
from Vietnam. To calculate the %MPS for rubber, adjustments for the quality difference, 
transportation and profits of rubber-exporting companies have to be taken into account. 
According to Trung Que Nguyen et al. (1997), rubber-exporting companies earn a profit 
of 0.3% of export prices and pay 5.9% of the export price for transportation and 
marketing costs in 1996. The adjusted reference price of rubber export is therefore:  
 Par = Pr · (1 - 0.059 - 0.003)  
As the farm price for rubber is only available since 1996, the rubber %MPS is 
estimated for the 1996-2002 period. Since 1994, importers demand low quality rubber 
(CSV10 and CSV20) for producing automobile wheels while demand for high quality 
rubber has been very limited. Hence, even some high quality rubber (CSV5 and CSV5L) 
has been sold at a low price. The domestic wholesale price is the average price for rubber 
in Vietnam. To calculate the rubber %MPS, we convert the average wholesale price for 
rubber, Pd ave, to the wholesale price for low quality rubber, Pd. According to Ngoc Anh 
Nguyen et al. (1995), in 1994, the low quality rubber accounted for 5% of the total rubber 
output, and the price of high quality rubber is 20% higher than the price of low quality 
rubber. The average wholesale price of rubber is:  
Pd ave = 0.95 · Pd · (1 + 0.2) + 0.05 · Pd = 1.19 · Pd 
or  
Pd = Pd ave/1.19 = 0.84 · Pd ave = (1 - 0.16) · Pd ave 
The %MPS for dried latex rubber, as shown in Figure 16, slightly fluctuated 
during 1996-2002 but is still marginally different from zero. While there was no political 
intervention in the rubber market, the fluctuations can be mainly explained by price 
developments. Since 1997, international prices of rubber have declined quickly and 
continuously. Though domestic prices (retail and farmer prices) developed in a similar 
 60
trend as international prices, they decreased more slowly. This fact results in a lower 
value of adjusted reference prices compared with farmer prices.  
Figure 16—MPS and NPC for rubber, 1985-2002 
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
%MPS NPC by Barker et al. (2001)
 
Source: Barker et al. (2001) and own calculations. 
According to Barker et al. (2001), NPRs for rubber are negative for the 1985-
2000 period based on a comparison between retail and export prices. Similarly in the 
study by GSO (1999), rubber is slightly disprotected after input subsidies are taken into 
account. The effective rate of protection calculated for rubber is –0.027 (1996).   
g.  Pepper 
In calculating the %MPS for pepper, farm prices and unit values of pepper export 
are utilized. Based on the study by Trung Que Nguyen et al. (2002), exporting companies 
earn a profit of 1.06% and spend 5.3% of the exporting price for transportation, 
packaging and marketing costs. The middlemen who buy pepper from farmers and sell it 
to exporting companies receive 11.4% of their selling prices. This gap covers their 
transportation costs from farm to exporting companies and their profit. About 70% of 
farmers sell pepper to the middlemen and the rest basically sells to exporting companies. 
The adjusted reference price is equal to:  
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 Par = Pr · (1 - 0.011 - 0.053) · (1 - 0.114) · 0.7 + Pr · (1 - 0.011 - 0.053) · 0.3   
        = Pr · (1 - 0.011 - 0.053) · [(1 - 0.114) · 0.7 + 0.3] 
The %MPS for pepper is marginally different from zero during 1990s (Figure 17). 
This result reflects the fact that there has been no policy support regarding pepper export 
from Vietnam. The adjusted reference price differs marginally from the farm price.  
In Barker et al. (2001), the nominal rate of protection for pepper was negative 
between 1990 and 2000 (Figure 17). Retail prices are slightly lower than border prices. 
The price gap can be attributed to transportation costs and marketing margin of exporting 
companies.  
Figure 17—MPS and NPC for pepper, 1985-2000 
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Source: Barker et al. (2001) and own calculations. 
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h.  Sugar 
In calculating the %MPS for sugar, cane prices are converted first into sugar 
prices and then compared with the adjusted border prices. The border price of sugar is the 
unit value of sugar import taken from FAO database. Based on Xuan Nguyen Nguyen et 
al. (1995), the loading fee at the port is 1% of the c.i.f. price, transportation costs from 
the port to the wholesale market account for 2%, and profits of the importers are 3% of 
the port price. The adjusted reference price to the wholesale market is:  
Par = Pr · (1 + 0.01) · (1 + 0.02 + 0.03) 
The domestic prices of sugar are converted from sugarcane prices. In refineries, 
processing costs account for 56.2% of total revenue, and profit is 3.6% of selling prices. 
The conversion rate factor is 9.74 (180,000 tons of sugarcane were used to produce 
18,477 tons of sugar in 1994). Hence, the producer price of sugar is:  
   Pd = Pf · 9.74/ (1-0.562-0.036) 
The adjusted reference price is compared with the producer price. The sugar 
%MPS, as presented in Figure 18, is positive and high since 1996, reflecting the 
protective policies over domestic production following the one-million-ton sugar 
program. In 1999-2001, an increase in domestic production and smuggling reduced 
domestic sugar prices.  
The protection estimate over sugar is confirmed by GSO (1999). In GSO (1999), 
the effective rate of protection over sugar was 1.65 in 1996. The result is rather similar to 
our estimation for sugar in 1996.  
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Figure 18—MPS for sugar, 1986-2001 
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Source: Own calculations. 
i.  Pig meat 
The pig meat %MPS calculation is conducted using farm prices and unit values of 
pig meat exports. The farm price is live weight price. Since pig meat export is mainly 
carcass, and canned meat and lean meat export accounts for a small share in total pig 
meat export, we conduct quality adjustment just for carcass. In general, pig meat export 
has a higher percentage of lean meat than pig meat consumed in the Vietnamese market. 
Specifically, the percentage of lean meat in the Vietnamese market is about 25% of pig 
meat, while the percentage of lean meat in pig meat export is 30-35%. The live weight 
price of pig meat sold in the Vietnamese market is VND 13,000-14,000 per kilogram 
while for pig meat export is VND 16,000 per kilogram. The quality adjustment is 
therefore 16% ( = (16,000 - 13,500) · 100 / 16,000).  
Farm prices are prices of fresh meat, while exported pig meat is usually 
processed. Therefore, apart from adjustment for transportation and marketing costs from 
farmers to processing and exporting companies and from these companies to the port, 
adjustment for processing costs is also needed in order to be able to compare farm and 
export prices.  
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According to Trung Que Nguyen et al. (1997), processing and transportation costs 
from processing and exporting companies to the port account for 18.8% of pig meat 
export prices, and their profits are about 0.7%. Transportation from farmers to the 
exporting companies is about 2% of the export price. Hence, the adjusted reference price 
of pig meat export is:  
Par = Pr  · (1 – 0.188 - 0.02 – 0.007) · (1-0.16) 
The negative %MPS calculated shows the disprotection over farmers who raise 
pigs (Figure 19). Given the subsidy to pig meat export since 1998, the high adjusted 
reference price compared with the farm price might be explained by the dominance of 
state-owned processing companies in pig meat export. As mentioned above, private 
slaughterhouses are prevented from exporting because of veterinary and SPS 
requirements. A limited number of state-owned processing and exporting companies give 
them a monopoly position and allows them sustain the gap between domestic and border 
prices. 
The disprotection over pig meat is supported by GSO (1999). In GSO (1999), the 
effective rate of protection is -0.106 for 1996. The pig meat %MPS calculated for the 
year 1996 is –12.8 which is more or less similar to the effective rate of protection for that 
year. This reflects the fact that input subsidies in raising pigs are negligible. 
Figure 19—MPS for pig meat, 1986-2002 
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4.4  PSE ESTIMATION 
PSE is estimated for rice and the whole agricultural sector. The reason for not 
computing PSE for other agricultural commodities is because of the impossibility to 
allocate budgetary payments, namely credit, electricity and fertilizer subsidies, across 
agricultural products.  
Estimation of the nominal PSE is based on equation (5) while that of the %PSE is 
based on equation (6) mentioned in section 4.1.  
a.  PSE for Rice 
In order to calculate the %PSE for rice, estimation of budgetary payments for rice 
is needed. Budgetary payments for agricultural production in Vietnam include basically 
irrigation fees, seed subsidies, preferential credits, and fertilizer and electricity subsidies. 
Since irrigation is mainly used for rice production, the irrigation subsidy is attributed 
wholly to rice and not allocated across commodities. Similarly, most seed subsidies are 
spent on rice due to the fact that rice is the most important agricultural item in terms of 
production value and export turnover. Adding the irrigation and seed subsidies gives 
budgetary payments to rice.  
The sum of the budgetary payments and nominal MPS for rice is the nominal 
PSE. The %PSE for rice is computed by the OECD and trade economist approaches. In 
the OECD approach, the %PSE for rice is equal to the nominal PSE divided by the sum 
of budgetary payments and the production of rice valued by the farm price. In the trade 
economist approach, the %PSE equals the nominal PSE divided by the production of rice 
valued by the farm-gate equivalent reference price. The results are represented in 
Appendix Table 1 and Figure 20. The difference between the %PSE measured is not so 
much except 1988 when super inflation increased domestic prices and the overvalued 
currency made reference prices being undervalued when being converted into 
Vietnamese Dong. In general, there is an increasing trend of support for rice. In the first 
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half of the nineties, rice was taxed as the %PSE was negative. Since 1997, rice has been 
increasingly protected and the protection reaches higher levels in the years 1999-2001.  
Figure 20—%PSE for rice, 1986-2002 
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Source: Own calculations 
b.  PSE for the Agricultural Sector  
To calculate the PSE for the whole agricultural sector, the nominal PSE is 
computed first by adding up nominal MPS for the agricultural sector with budgetary 
payments for the agricultural sector.   
As nominal MPS for the agricultural sector is equal to the sum of nominal MPS 
for all agricultural commodities, it seems very difficult to be reached given a limited 
number of selected commodities under consideration due to resource constraints. Hence, 
two different approaches have been used:  i) protection for commodities which have not 
been included in the MPS calculations is the same as for the nine included commodities, 
and ii) non-included commodities are not protected. In the first assumption, the nominal 
MPS calculated for chosen commodities, MPSc, will be scaled up to the whole 
agricultural sector, using the share of output value of selected commodities in total 
 67
agricultural output value. In the second approach, the nominal MPS for the whole 
agricultural sector equals the nominal MPS of the selected commodities.  
The nominal MPS for the whole agricultural sector is then added to the budgetary 
payments PP for the agricultural sector to give the nominal PSE for the agricultural 
sector. Specifically, PSEc corresponds to the sum of MPSc and PP, and PSE corresponds 
to the sum of MPS and PP. The budgetary payments here include subsidies for irrigation, 
seed, fertilizer and electricity and preferential credits for all agriculture. The budgetary 
payments just become significant since 1995 with a sharp increase in irrigation subsidy.   
Having the nominal PSE for the whole agricultural sector, we follow the OECD 
and trade economist approaches to get the %PSE for the agricultural sector (see 
Appendix Table 2). 
Following the OECD approach, the nominal PSE is divided by the sum of the 
agricultural output value at farm prices and the budgetary payments. As the nominal PSE 
is computed for two cases: ‘scaling up’ and ‘without scaling up’, the %PSE is calculated 
correspondingly (Figure 21). A comparison of the %PSE results for ‘scaling up’ and 
‘without scaling up’ cases shows they follow a similar  trend and only differ much in 
value in the early 1990s when MPS was negative and the covered share relatively low. 
The general similarity results from the included commodities accounting for about 70% 
of total agricultural production. However, the %PSE calculated in the second scenario 
seems more likely to be the fact, as most important agricultural commodities, which are 
more likely to be subject to policy attention, are chosen for investigation. Excluded 
commodities do receive negligible policy attention. The scaling up procedure thus gives 
upward biased results, as the assumption that excluded and included commodities are 
subject to similar protection levels does not hold well.  
Following the trade economist approach, the nominal PSE for the agricultural 
sector is divided by agricultural production valued by the farm-gate equivalent 
international prices. Here, the %PSE is calculated also for scaling up and without scaling 
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up cases (Appendix Table 2). The %PSE of the trade economist approach is greater than 
that of the OECD approach. Hence, the OECD approach using the domestic farm-gate 
prices in valuing the agricultural output gives a lower estimate of agricultural protection 
during the years that protection does exist and overestimates agricultural disprotection 
when there is a tax. Because of the difference in the denominators, the %PSE by the 
OECD and trade economist approaches get similar as the absolute values of the %PSE 
are small. When the MPS and the budgetary payments cancel each other, the difference 
between the %PSE of the two approaches disappears. In case of Vietnam during 1987-
2002, the difference in the %PSE results by the OECD and trade economist approaches is 
marginal as the %PSE in the OECD approach remains at a moderate level.  
In general, the %PSE calculated shows that protection in Vietnam is recently at 
moderate and acceptable levels. It should be noted that the results might be slightly 
underestimated, as seed subsidies in programs at the provincial level could not be taken 
into account. Similarly, loans with preferential interest rates provided to minorities in the 
early 1990s by the Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development have not been included 
due to the lack of data. Concessional loans as promoted in the one-million-ton sugar 
program and the tea production promotion at the local level are not incorporated as well. 
 Figure 21—%PSE in agriculture, 1987-2002 
 
Source: Own calculations.  
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Agricultural protection and support seems to emerge and increase in the recent 
half decade in Vietnam. In the first half of the 1990s, most %MPS calculated for 
commodities and %PSE for the whole agricultural sector were negative implying that 
there was a net tax on agriculture. This was the time of opening the economy and starting 
to widen international trade relations. Trading enterprises tried to increase export 
revenues, without receiving any state support. The dominance and monopoly position of 
the state-owned sector, restrictive trade policies like export quotas and licenses, and 
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distorted markets and prices in the country are underlying reasons of the agricultural 
disprotection. In addition, de facto large inefficiencies in the production and processing 
of agricultural commodities lead to lower farm prices, and thus indirectly result in 
disprotection. In the second half of the 1990s, %MPS of some commodities and %PSE 
turned out to be positive. This is due to the fact that obstacles to free trade have been 
gradually removed and more supporting policies have been designed to encourage 
agricultural production and export. 
The pre-1990 %MPS and %PSE may not give a true story because of distorted 
economic indices, namely the overvalued exchange rate, super inflation and centrally set 
prices of domestic commodities at that time. The overvalued exchange rate undervalues 
exportables or importables when these are converted into Vietnamese Dongs. Meanwhile, 
the super inflation during 1986-89 increased domestic prices of Vietnamese commodities, 
resulting briefly in high and positive %MPS and %PSE. 
Protection varies from commodity to commodity. Rice, tea and sugar are 
protected while pig meat, groundnut, coffee and cashew nut are disprotected. Rubber and 
pepper reflect a neutral situation where their adjusted reference prices are more or less the 
same as the farm prices. This may be due to supporting policies regarding specific 
commodities. For commodities which have been exported for a longer time period like 
rice and tea, there have been many encouraging measures designed to promote the export 
of these items. Sugar and sugarcane are specified as an import substitute and hedged by 
import quota and tariff. For commodities where the exports increased recently or their 
share in total export revenue account for small parts in agricultural export revenue, like 
groundnut and pig meat, there have not been many supporting policies and the calculated 
%MPS is negative.      
These commodity-specific results are then compared with other studies on 
protection rates in agriculture in Vietnam. The results are often consistent with our 
calculations but also indicate that neglecting adjustment factors may lead to wrong signs 
of the estimated protection or disprotection.  
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In summary, the development of the Vietnamese agricultural sector in the last 
sixteen years with increases in production and export of several agricultural products is 
very impressive. This helps improving directly the livelihood of many Vietnamese poor 
who live based on agriculture and at the same time provides a source of foreign exchange 
earning for the country. The development in agriculture is a result of the market-oriented 
reform, and later, direct agricultural supporting policies. Commodity-specific policies are 
gradually designed as the importance of the commodities in terms of foreign exchange 
earnings or savings grows. The protection calculated is therefore increasing over time, 
and turns out to be positive recently. However, it is in general at a low and acceptable 
level compared with other countries. Protection over agro-industry, however, seems to be 
costly as in the case of sugar. The findings are in accordance with qualitative assessments 
from other studies (UNDP, 2004 and ISG, 2001). Vietnamese supporting policies show 
the same trend as developing countries, based more on market-based measures than on 
budgetary payments. With the low level of agricultural protection, there may not be a 
serious problem in the agricultural production and farmers’ income if Vietnam continues 
its integration process. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix Table 1—Vietnam’s agricultural MPS, 1986-2002 
 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Exchange rate 
(VND/US$) 
174 797 703 3,250 6,750 10,037 11,202 10,641 10,966 11,038 11,033 11,683 13,268 13,943 14,168 14,725 15,280 
        
Rice 
         
Pfob (US$/tons) 164 142 298 204 188 227 215 211 214 267 285 244 273 227 192 168 224 
Pfob (VND/kg) 28 113 210 664 1,266 2,278 2,405 2,243 2,350 2,943 3,141 2,846 3,627 3,170 2,721 2,472 3,423 
Par (VND/kg) 22 89 165 521    994 1,788 1,887 1,760 1,844 2,309 2,465 2,233 2,846 2,488 2,135 1,940 2,686 
Pd (VND/kg) 19 111 509 569    617 1,316 1,471 1,372 1,444 1,848 2,563 2,670 3,465 3,474 2,922 2,784 3,131 
%MPS  -13.6 24.7 208.5 9.2 -37.9 -26.4 -22.0 -22.0 -21.7 -20.0 4.0  19.6   21.7   39.6 36.9 43.5   16.6 
 Coffee  
 
 
Pfob (US$/tons) 2,559 1,954 1,733 1,411 1,032    816    787    903   1,872   2,411   1,409   1,270   1,554   1,213 683 420 445.8 
Pfob (VND/kg) 445 1,557 1,218 4,586 6,966 8,190 8,816 9,609 20,528 26,613 15,545 14,837 20,618 16,913 9,677 6,184 6,813 
Par (VND/kg) 268 937 733 2,761 4,193 4,930 5,307 5,785 12,358 16,021 9,358 8,932 12,412 10,182 5,825 3,723 4,101 
Pd (VND/kg) 173 593 2,600 4,305 3,389 5,751 7,419 8,139 8,952 8,850 5,340 8,819 11,529 15,052 9,707   
%MPS  -35.4 -36.7 254.7 55.9 -19.2 16.6 39.8 40.7 -27.6 -44.8 -42.9 -1.3 -7.1 47.8 66.6   
        
Tea 
         
Pfob (US$/tons) 1,395 1,450 1,411 1,508 1,536 1,159 1,243      957 1,098 1,011 1,442 1,466 1,530 1,254 1,252 1,155 1,103 
Pfob (VND/kg) 243 1,156    992 4,901 10,370 11,637 13,928 10,190 12,039 11,155 15,913 17,129 20,302 17,486 17,734 17,003 16,849 
Par (VND/kg) 233 1,108    951 4,700   9,945 11,160 13,356   9,771 11,546 10,698 15,260 16,426 19,470 16,769 17,007 16,306 16,158 
Pd (VND/kg) 205 447 2,599 5,500   5,450  9,249 11,931 13,088 14,397 16,931 15,126 16,824 22,314 23,172 20,359 21,387 18,500 
%MPS  -12.0 -59.6 173.3 17.0 -45.2 -17.1 -10.7 33.9 24.7 58.3 -0.9 2.4 14.6 38.2 19.7 31.2 14.5 
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 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
        Cashew nut         
Pfob (US$/tons) 798 1,002 1,002 671 603 687 801 1,048 1,402 1,717 3,636 4,004 4,551 5,965 4,892 3,479 3,376 
Pfob (VND/kg) 139 798 705 2,181 4,068 6,898 8,973 11,154 15,377 18,954 40,120 46,799 60,387 83,164 69,316 51,236 51,528 
Par (VND/kg) 84 481 426 1,315 2,453 4,161 5,412 2,613 3,615 4,456 5,851 6,825 8,806 12,127 10,109 7,472 7,514 
Pd (VND/kg)     1,700 3,000 3,870 4,245 4,670 5,492 5,761 5,985 8,879 11,722 9,705 7,576 6,750 
%MPS      -30.7 -27.9 -28.5 61.8 29.2 23.2 -1.5 -12.3 -0.8 -3.3 -4.0 1.4 -10.2 
        Groundnut         
Pfob (US$/tons) 448.5 471 508  556  576  607  510  438  584 662.6   685 548    483   590   538  488  486 
Pfob (VND/kg) 78 375 357 1,807 3,888 6,093 5,717 4,662 6,403 7,314 7,558 6,405   6,413  8,227  7,619 7,188 7,426 
Par (VND/kg) 52 249 237 1,198 2,576 4,038 3,789 3,089 4,243 4,847 5,009 4,244   4,250  5,452  5,049 4,763 4,921 
Pd (VND/kg) 38 135 700 1,650 1,584 1,983 2,005 2,556 2,850 3,580 4,394 4,620   4,991  5,156  4,600 4,853 4,400 
%MPS  -26.9 -45.8 195.3 37.7 -38.5 -50.9 -47.1 -17.2 -32.8 -26.1 -12.3    8.8   17.4  -5.4  -8.9   1.9 -10.6 
        Rubber        
Pfob (US$/tons) 815 811 850    813    875    788    817    773      999   1,361   1,308      981     667    554    607    539     592 
Pfob (VND/kg) 142 646 597 2,642 5,906 7,909 9,152 8,225 10,955 15,023 14,431 11,461   8,850   7,724 8,600 7,937   9,051 
Par (VND/kg) 133 606 560 2,478 5,540 7,419 8,585 7,715 10,276 14,092 13,536 10,750 8,301 7,245 8,067 7,445 8,490 
Pd (VND/kg)           9,839 10,954 9,300 8,479 7,659 6,456 10,080 
%MPS            -27.3 1.9 12.0 17.0 -5.0 -13.3 18.7 
        Black pepper        
Pfob (US$/tons) 3,323 3,814 2,654 1,653 1,544 1,086    686      953   1,656   2,179   1,846   2,733   4,265   3,942   3,569 1,601 1,403 
Pfob (VND/kg) 578 3,040 1,866 5,372 10,422 10,900 7,685 10,141 18,160 24,052 20,367 31,930 56,588 54,963 50,566 23,575 21,432 
Par (VND/kg) 498 2,617 1,607 4,625 8,973 9,385 6,617   8,731 15,636 20,709 17,536 27,492 48,723 47,323 43,537 20,298 18,453 
Pd (VND/kg) 520 2,900 7,600 7,700 8,220 9,980 7,780 9,600 17,540 21,080 18,500 29,700 52,000 51,500 40,500   
%MPS  4.4 10.8 372.9   66.5 -8.4   6.3  17.6     9.9   12.2    1.8    5.5    8.0     6.7    8.8   -7.0   
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 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
        Sugar        
Pcif (US$/tons) 303 301 331 351 374 316 301 293 346 392 396 200 181 162 210 262  
Pcif (VND/kg) 53 240 232 1,141 2,526 3,176 3,371 3,123 3,790 4,324 4,372 2,337 2,405 2,257 2,970 3,859  
Par (VND/kg) 56 254 246 1,209 2,678 3,367 3,573 3,310 4,017 4,583 4,634 2,477 2,549 2,392 3,148 4,090  
Pd (VND/kg) 73 363 436 1,042 969 1,647 2,132 2,326 2,568 3,004 13,932 11,654 11,557 10,685 8,868 15,773  
%MPS  30.4 42.9 77.2 -13.8 -63.8 -51.1 -40.3 -29.7 -36.1 -34.4 200.6 370.5 353.4 346.7 181.7 285.6  
 
 
       Pig meat         
Pfob (US$/tons) 16589 1,714 1,750 1,715 1,723 1,800 1,742 1,746 1,353 1,707 1,751 2,750 2,045 1,619 1,607 1,614 1,277 
Pfob (VND/kg) 2,886 1,366 1,230 5,574 11,628 18,065 19,517 18,581 14,839 18,842 19,316 32,125 27,130 22,568 22,772 23,763 19,511 
Par (VND/kg) 1,903    901    811 3,675  7,668 11,912 12,869 12,252   9,785 12,424 12,737 21,183 17,889 14,882 15,016 15,669 12,866 
Pd (VND/kg) 84 323 1,700 3,230  3,045 5,489 5,536 7,203   7,761 11,206 11,157 10,132 10,412 12,020 10,412 9,728 13,562 
%MPS  -95.6 -64.3 108.6 -12.5 -60.5 -54.1 -57.2 -41.5 -21.0 -10.2 -12.8 -52.4 -42.0 -19.6 -31.0 -38.2 4.9 
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Appendix Table 2—Vietnam’s PSE, 1986-2002  
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
        PSE for rice         
Nominal PSE  
(VND bill.) 
-33 228 3,823 623 -4,648 -5,864 -5,648 -5,558 -5,911 -7,129 2,143 8,312 12,335 20,799  17,204 18,304 10,737 
• MPS -33 220 3,784 576 -4,712 -5,994 -5,824 -5,742 -6,120 -7,468 1,666 7,822 11,699 20,114 16,606 17,640 9,968 
• Budgetary 
payments 
   8    39   47     64    130    176    184   209   339 477   490   636   685   598   664   769 
PSE (%)-   
  OECD 
  Denominator 
-15.8 20.4   67.8 9.1   -59.8   -34.8   -27.2   -27.1   -26.5    -23.5   4.9 17.2 18.6 29.1 27.6 31.1 15.1 
  Trade Economist 
  Denominator 
-13.6 25.6 210.6 10.0   -37.4   -25.8   -21.4   -21.3  -20.9   -19.1   5.1 20.8 22.9 41.0 38.2 45.1 17.8 
  Difference   2.2   5.2 142.8   0.9    22.4     9.0     5.8     5.8    5.6     4.4   0.2   3.6   4.3 11.9 10.6 14.0   2.7 
       PSE for agriculture        
Measure support 
(VND bill.) 
                 
• MPSc  -174 4,685   462 -8,980 -11,725 -12,687 -9,841 -9,187 -10,932 2,368 -491 8,006 25,825 16,573 12,695 11,186 
• Budgetary 
Payments 
    8    39   47   1,066  795    605    485   -1,138  3,703 488 1,702   882   1,742   -126   632   1,063 
• Covered 
share (%) 
  86.0   86.9   69.9   64.0   61.6   57.9    61.0    62.7   61.6  75.7  82.6   80.5   82.9   74.2    69.0    82.3 
• MPS  -203 5,394 661 -14,021 -19,031 -21,995 -16,127 -14,647 -17,730 3,128 -594 9,948 31,139 22,335 18,406 13,585 
PSE (VN bill.)                  
• PSEc    -166 4,724 509   -7,914 -10,930   -12,082   -9,356   -10,325 -7,229 2,856 1,211 8,888 27,567 16,447 13,327 12,249 
• PSE  -195 5,433 708 -12,955 -18,236 -21,390 -15,642 -15,785 -14,027 3,616 1,108 10,830 32,881 22,209 19,038 14,648 
PSE (%)-                  
OECD denominator                  
• PSEc  -13.4 60.6   3.8 -36.4 -25.6 -24.3 -17.2 -16.2 -8.1 3.1 1.2 7.8 21.4 13.1 10.6 9.7 
• PSE   -15.6 69.7 5.3 -59.6 -42.7 -43.1 -28.7 -24.8 -15.7 3.9 1.1 9.5 25.6 17.7 15.1 11.6 
Trade Economist 
Denominator 
                 
• PSEc  -9.4 175.3     3.9 -26.9 -20.9  -18.4    -15.1   -15.8   -8.1     3.4   1.4   8.5    28.2    15.5    13.1    11.7 
• PSE  -11.0 201.6   5.5 -44.1 -34.8  -32.6  -25.3   -24.2   -15.7   4.4   1.3   10.3    33.6    20.9    18.7    14.0 
Source: Own calculations 
*: The denominator for the %PSE for the trade economist approach is obtained by first summing included commodities valued at the adjusted reference price and 
then scaling this sum by the share of included commodities in total agricultural sector.  
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Appendix Table 3—Components of MPS estimates 
 Agricultural commodities 
Category Rice Coffee Tea Cashew nut 
Period coverage (Calendar years) 1986-2002 1986-2000 1986-2002 1990-2002 
     
Trade status Exportable Exportable Exportable Exportable 
     
Reference domestic market Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale 
     
Border Price f.o.b. Vietnamese port f.o.b. Vietnamese 
port 
f.o.b. Vietnamese 
port 
f.o.b. Vietnamese 
port 
 Source FAO database  FAO database FAO database FAO database 
     
• Exchange Rate  Annual average  Annual average Annual average Annual average 
Source IMF, 2003 IMF, 2003 IMF, 2003 IMF, 2003 
     
Internal Cost Adjustments  19.1% of the f.o.b. price. 39.8% of the f.o.b. 
price  
4.1% of the f.o.b 
price. 
49% of the f.o.b. 
price of unprocessed 
cashew nut. 
Port charges 2% of the f.o.b. price    
Handling and Transport from Port to 
Wholesale 
7.3% of the f.o.b. price 10% of the f.o.b. 
price 
3.6% of the f.o.b 
price. 
23% of the f.o.b. 
price of unprocessed 
cashew nut 
Marketing margin of Traders 9.8% of the f.o.b. price 4% of the f.o.b. price. 0.5% of the f.o.b 
price. 
26% of the f.o.b. 
price of unprocessed 
cashew nut 
Transportation costs and Marketing 
margin of Assemblers 
 30% of the selling 
price to exporters 
 0.8% of the selling 
price to exporters 
 Sources Xuan Nguyen Nguyen et al. (1995) 
Trung Que Nguyen et al. (1997)  
Khiem et al. (1996) 
Trung Que Nguyen et 
al. (1997) 
Van Dien Le et al. 
(1990) 
Trung Que Nguyen et 
al. (2002) 
Domestic Price (farm price) Farm prices of paddy converted to 
producer prices of milled rice 
Farm price Farm price Farm price 
 Sources GSO Xuan Nguyen Nguyen et al. 
(1995) 
GSO GSO GSO 
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 Agricultural commodities 
Category Rice Coffee Tea Cashew nut 
Internal Cost Adjustments for Domestic Output 
(MM)  
    
 • Conversion factor 0.70   1.645 (1990-92) 
4.225 (1993-95) 
6.805 (1996-2002) 
  Sources Xuan Nguyen Nguyen et al. (1995)   IAPP (1997) 
Trung Que Nguyen et 
al. (1997) 
       
Quality and Process Level Adjustments 3%     
  Source IAE (2001)    
 
Category Groundnut Rubber Black pepper Sugar  Pig meat  
Period coverage (Calendar years) 1986-2002 1996-2002 1986-2000 1986-2001 1986-2002 
      
Trade status Exportable Exportable Exportable Importable Exportable 
      
Reference domestic market Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale 
      
Border Price f.o.b. Vietnamese 
port 
f.o.b. Vietnamese port f.o.b. Vietnamese port c.i.f. Vietnamese port f.o.b. Vietnamese 
port 
      
 Source FAO database FAO database FAO database FAO database FAO database 
• Exchange Rate  Annual average  Annual average Annual average Annual average Annual average 
Source IMF, 2003 IMF, 2003 IMF, 2003 IMF, 2003 IMF, 2003 
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 Agricultural commodities (contd.) 
Category Groundnut Rubber Black pepper Sugar  Pig meat 
Internal Cost Adjustments  11% of f.o.b. price 6.2% of f.o.b. price 6.4% of f.o.b. price 6% of c.i.f. price 21.5% of f.o.b. 
price 
Port charges/Loading fees    1% of the c.i.f. price  
Handling and Transport from 
Port to Wholesale 
8.5% 5.9% 5.3%  2% of the port price 20.8% 
Marketing margin of Traders 2.5% 0.3% 1.1%  3% of the port price 0.7% 
 Source Trung Que Nguyen et 
al. (1997)  
Trung Que  Nguyen et 
al. (1997) 
Trung Que Nguyen et 
al. (2002) 
Trung Que Nguyen et 
al. (1997) 
Trung Que Nguyen 
et al. (1997) 
       
Domestic Price (farmgate or other) Farm price Farm price Farm price Farm prices of 
sugarcane converted 
into producer prices 
of sugar 
Farm price 
 Source GSO GSO GSO GSO GSO 
Internal Cost Adjustments for 
Domestic Output  
     
 • Conversion factor 0.89   9.74  
  Sources Trung Que Nguyen et 
al. (1997) 
  IAPP (1997) 
Trung Que Nguyen et 
al. (1997) 
 
        
Quality and Process Level 
Adjustments 
 16%   16% 
  Source  Ngoc Anh Nguyen et al. 
(1995) 
  Trong Ngu Nguyen 
(2004)* 
* : information from interview with Trong Ngu Nguyen, Lecturer, College of Agriculture, Cantho University, Vietnam. 
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Appendix Table 4—Calculation of MPS and PSE for rice 
 
 Unit 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1. Total production Mill. 
tons 
 11 10   11   12    12.5   12.7      14    14.8     15.3       16.2   17      17.9      18.9      20.4       21.1    20.9      22.4 
2. Reference price 
(Pfob)  
VND/kg 28 113   210  664 1,266 2,278  2,405  2,243  2,350  2,943 3,141   2,846  3,627   3,170   2,721   2,472  3,423 
3. Marketing margin % 19.1   19.1    19.1    19.1      19.1      19.1       19.1      19.1       19.1       19.1    19.1        19.1      19.1       19.1      19.1       19.1        19.1 
4. Marketing margin VND/kg    5   21      40    127    242    435     459    428     449     562    600      544     693      605     520      472      654 
5. Quality adjustment %    3     3        3       3        3        3         3        3         3         3        3         3         3          3         3          3          3 
6. Quality adjustment VND/kg    1     3        5     16      30      55        59      55       57       72      76        69        88        77        66        60        83 
7. Adjusted reference 
price (Par)  
VND/kg  22   89    165    521    994   1,788   1,887  1,760  1,844  2,309 2,465   2,233   2,846   2,488   2,135   1,940   2,686 
8. Average farm price 
(Pd)  
VND/kg   19 111    509    569     617   1,316   1,471  1,372  1,444  1,848 2,563   2,670   3,465   3,474   2,922   2,784   3,131 
9. Market price 
support (MPS) 
VND bn -33 220 3,784 576 -4,712 -5,994 -5,824 -5,742 -6,120 -7,468 1,666 7,822 11,699 20,114 16,606 17,640 9,968 
10. Market price 
support (MPS) 
% -13.6   24.7 208.5    9.2      -37.9      -26.4      -22.0      -22.0      -21.7     -20.0      4.0        19.6        21.7        39.6        36.9        43.5        16.6 
11. Budgetary 
payments 
VND bn    8    39   47     64    130    176    184   209   339 477   490   636   685   598   664   769 
12. Producer support 
estimate (PSE) 
VND bn -33 228 3,823 623 -4,648 -5,864 -5,648 -5,558 -5,911 -7,129 2,143 8,312 12,335 20,799  17,204 18,304 10,737 
13. Producer support 
estimate (PSE) 
% 
15.8 0.4 7.8 .1 -59.8 -34.8 -27.2 -27.1 -26.5 -23.5 4.9 17.2 18.6 29.1 27.6 31.1 15.1
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Appendix Table 5—Calculation of MPS for coffee 
 
 Unit 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1. Total production 1000 
tons 
  18.8   20.5    31.3    40.8   59.3      67    71.8  131.3      180       218     316.9     420.5      409.3     553.2 802.5 840.6 688.7 
2. Reference price 
(Pfob)  
VND/kg 445 1,557 1,218 4,586 6,966 8,190 8,816 9,609 20,528 26,613 15,545 14,837 20,618 16,913 9,677 6,184 6,813 
3. Marketing margin %   39.8   39.8    39.8   39.8    39.8    39.8    39.8    39.8      39.8       39.8      39.8       39.8       39.8       39.8    39.8    39.8    39.8
4. Marketing margin VND/kg 177 620    485 1,825 2,773 3,260 3,509 3,824   8,170 10,592   6,187   5,905   8,206  6,731 3,852 2,461 2,712 
5. Adjusted reference 
price (Par)  
VND/kg 268 937    733 2,761 4,193 4,930 5,307 5,785 12,358 16,021   9,358   8,932 12,412 10,182 5,825 3,723 4,101 
6. Average farm price 
(Pd)  
VND/kg 173 593 2,600 4,305 3,389 5,751 7,419 8,139   8,952   8,850   5,340   8,819 11,529 15,052 9,707   
7. Market price support 
(MPS) 
VND bn   -2   -7   58     62   -49     53    150    306     -623 -1,579 -1,287      -65     -385   2,668 3,093   
8. Market price support 
(MPS) 
% -35.4 -36.7 254.7    55.9  -19.2    16.6    39.8    40.7       -27.6      -44.8     -42.9        -1.3        -7.1        47.8    66.6   
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Appendix Table 6—Calculation of MPS for tea  
 
 Unit 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1. Total production 1000 
tons 
30.1   29.0 29.7 30.2      32.2 33.1     36.2       37.7       42       40.2        46.8       52.2      56.6        70.3       69.9      75.7       89.6 
2. Reference price 
(Pfob)  
VND/kg 243 1,156    992 4,901 10,370 11,63
7 
13,928 10,190 12,039 11,155 15,913 17,129 20,302 17,486 17,734 17,003 16,849 
3. Marketing margin %     4.1      4.1     4.1 4.1         4.1 4.1         4.1          4.1         4.1         4.1         4.1         4.1        4.1         4.1         4.1        4.1         4.1 
4. Marketing margin VND/kg   10      48      41    201      425 477      572      419      493      557      653      703      832      717      727      697      691 
5. Adjusted reference 
price (Par)  
VND/kg 233 1,108    951 4,700   9,945 11,16
0 
13,356   9,771 11,546 10,698 15,260 16,426 19,470 16,769 17,007 16,306 16,158 
6. Average farm price 
(Pd)  
VND/kg 205     447 2,599 5,500   5,450  9,249 11,931 13,088 14,397 16,931 15,126 16,824 22,314 23,172 20,359 21,387 18,500 
7. Market price support 
(MPS) 
VND bn -0.8 -19     49      24 -145 -63      -52      125      120     250        -6        21        16         45      234      385      210 
8. Market price support 
(MPS) 
% -12.0 -59.6 173.3 17.0 -45.2 -17.1      -10.7       33.9       24.7       58.3        -0.9          2.4        14.6       38.2       19.7        31.2       14.5 
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Appendix Table 7—Calculation of MPS for cashew nut 
 
 Unit 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1. Total production 1000 
tons 
80 100 80 100 140 160 94.8 186.4 208 202.4 236.4 267.6 216 164.8 270.4 292.8 515.2 
2. Reference price 
(Pfob)  
VND/kg 139 798 705 2,181 4,068 6,898 8,973 11,15
4 
15,377 18,954 40,120 46,799 60,387 83,164 69,316 51,236 51,528 
3. Quality difference % 39.2 39.2 39.2 39.2 39.2 39.2 39.2 76.3 76.3 76.3 85.3 85.3 85.3 85.3 85.3 85.3 85.3 
4. Quality difference VND/kg 54 313 276 855 1,595 2,704 3,517 8,510 11,733 14,462 34,222 39,919 51,510 70,939 59,126 43,704 43,953 
5. Marketing margin % 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
6. Marketing margin VND/kg 1 4 3 11 20 33 44 21 29 36 47 55 71 98 81 60 61 
7. Adjusted reference 
price (Par)  
VND/kg 84 481 426 1,315 2,453 4,161 5,412 2,613 3,615 4,456 5,851 6,825 8,806 12,127 10,109 7,472 7,514 
8. Average farm price 
(Pd)  
VND/kg     1,700 3,000 3,870 4,245 4,670 5,492 5,761 5,985 8,879 11,722 9,705 7,576 6,750 
9. Market price support 
(MPS) 
VND bn     -102 -179 -141 312 233 226 -826 -1041 -836 -961 -1333 -949 -2133 
10. Market price support 
(MPS) 
%     -30.7 -27.9 -28.5 61.8 29.2 23.2 -1.5 -12.3 -0.8 -3.3 -4.0 1.4 -10.2 
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Appendix Table 8—Calculation of MPS for groundnut 
 
 Unit 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1. Total production 1000 
tons 
210.6 230 213 206 213 235 227 259 294 334 358 351 386 318 355 363 397 
2. Reference price 
(Pfob)  
VND/kg 78 375 357 1,807 3,888 6,093 5,717 4,662 6,403 7,314 7,558 6,405 6,413 8,227 7,619 7,188 7,426 
3. Processing costs and 
marketing margin 
VND/kg 26 126 120 609 1,312 2,055 1,928 1,573 2,160 2,467 2,549 2,161 2,163 2,775 2,570 2,425 2,505 
4. Adjusted reference 
price (Par)  
VND/kg 52 249 237 1,198 2,576 4,038 3,789 3,089 4,243 4,847 5,009 4,244 4,250 5,452 5,049 4,763 4,921 
5. Average farm price 
(Pd)  
VND/kg 38 135 700 1,650 1,584 1,983 2,005 2,556 2,850 3,580 4,394 4,620 4,991 5,156 4,600 4,853 4,400 
6. Market price support 
(MPS) 
VND bn -3 -26 99 93 -211 -482 -404 -138 -410 -424 -220 132 286 -94 -159 32 -21 
7. Market price support 
(MPS) 
% -26.9 -45.8 195.3 37.7 -38.5 -50.9 -47.1 -17.2 -32.8 -26.1 -12.3    8.8 17.4 -5.4 -8.9 1.9 -10.6 
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Appendix Table 9—Calculation of MPS for rubber 
 
 Unit 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1. Total production 1000 
tons 
50 52 50 51 58 65 67 97 129 125 142 186 193 249 291 313 331 
2. Reference price 
(Pfob)  
VND/kg 142 646 597 2,642 5,906 7,909 9,152 8,225 10,955 15,023 14,431 11,461   8,850 7,724 8,600 7,937   9,051 
3. Marketing margin % 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 
4. Marketing margin VND/kg 9 40 37 164 366 490 567 510 679 931 895 710 549 479 533 492 561 
5. Adjusted reference 
price (Par)  
VND/kg 133 606 560 2,478 5,540 7,419 8,585 7,715 10,276 14,092 13,536 10,750 8,301 7,245 8,067 7,445 8,490 
6. Average farm price 
(Pd)  
VND/kg           11,713 13,041 11,071 10,094 9,118 7,686 12,000 
7. Quality adjustment %           16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
8. Quality adjustment VND/kg           1,874 2,087 1,771 1,615 1,459 1,230 1,920 
9. Domestic price for 
(low quality) exported 
rubber 
VND/kg           9,839 10,954 9,300 8,479 7,659 6,456 10,080 
10. Market price support 
(MPS) 
VND bn           -526 39 194 308 -118 -308 528 
11. Market price support 
(MPS) 
%           -27.3 1.9 12.0 17.0 -5.0 -13.3 18.7 
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Appendix Table 10—Calculation of MPS for black pepper 
 
 Unit 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1. Total production 1000 
tons 
    4       5        6        7          9          9        8         7         9         9        10.5       13        16        31        39       44        51 
2. Reference price 
(Pfob)  
VND/kg 578 3,040 1,866 5,372 10,422 10,900 7,685 10,141 18,160 24,052 20,367 31,930 56,588 54,963 50,566 23,575 21,432 
3. Marketing margin %   13.9    13.9   13.9   13.9     13.9     13.9   13.9    13.9    13.9      13.9       13.9       13.9     13.9      13.9       13.9       13.9       13.9 
4. Marketing margin VND/kg   80    423    259    747 1,449   1,515 1,068   1,410   2,524   3,343   2,831   4,438   7,865   7,640   7,029   3,277   2,979 
5. Adjusted reference 
price (Par)  
VND/kg 498 2,617 1,607 4,625 8,973   9,385 6,617   8,731 15,636 20,709 17,536 27,492 48,723 47,323 43,537 20,298 18,453 
 
6. Average farm price 
(Pd)  
VND/kg 520 2,900 7,600 7,700 8,220   9,980 7,780   9,600 17,540 21,080 18,500 29,700 52,000 51,500 40,500   
7. Market price support 
(MPS) 
VND bn 0.08 1 37 22 -6    5      9        6       17       3       10        28      52      129 -120   
8. Market price support 
(MPS) 
% 4.4 10.8 372.9 66.5 -8.4        6.3 17.6        9.9      12.2      1.8         5.5          8.0       6.7         8.8 -7.0   
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Appendix Table 11—Calculation of MPS for sugar 
 
 Unit 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1. Total production 1000 
tons 
4,966 5,467 5,700 5,345 5,398 6,131 6,437 6,083 7,550 10,711 11,430 11,921 13,843 17,760 15,246 14,657 
2. Reference price (Pcif)  VND/kg 53 240 232 1,141 2,526 3,176 3,371 3,123 3,790 4,324   4,372 2,337  2,405 2,257 2,970 3,859 
3. Marketing margin %   6     6     6       6       6       6       6       6       6       6          6        6         6        6        6        6 
4. Marketing margin VND/kg   3   14   14      68    152    191    202    187    227    259     262    140     144    135    178    231 
5. Adjusted reference 
price (Par)  
VND/kg 56 254 246 1,209 2,678 3,367 3,573 3,310 4,017 4,583   4,634 2,477  2,549 2,392 3,148 4,090 
6. Average farm price 
(Pd)  
VND/kg 73 363 436 1,042    969 1,647 2,132 2,326 2,568 3,004 13,932 11,654 11,557 10,685 8,868 15,773 
7. Market price support 
(MPS) 
VND bn 4 25 45 -33 -371 -422 -368 -234 -432 -666   4,421 4,534   5,169   6,106 3,630 7,106 
8. Market price support 
(MPS) 
% 30.4 42.9 77.2 -13.8 -63.8 -51.1 -40.3 -29.7 -36.1 -34.4    200.6 370.5 353.4 346.7 181.7 285.6 
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Appendix Table 12—Calculation of MPS for pig meat 
 
 Unit 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1. Total production 1000 
tons 
605 628 658 665 729 716 820 878 958 1,007 1,052 1,154 1,228 1,318 1,409 1,515 1,654 
2. Reference price 
(Pfob)  
VND/kg 2,886 1,366 1,230 5,574 11,62
8 
18,06
5 
19,51
7 
18,58
1 
14,83
9 
18,84
2 
19,31
6 
32,125 27,130 22,568 22,772 23,763 19,511 
3. Marketing margin %    21.5    21.5   21.5    21.5    21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5       21.5       21.5        21.5       21.5       21.5 
4. Marketing margin VND/kg    621  294   264 1,199 2,500 3,884 4,196 3,995 3,190 4,051 4,153 6,907   5,833   4,852   4,896   5,109   4,195 
5. Quality adjustment %      16    16     16     16      16 16     16 16     16     16    16      16        16        16       16        16       16 
6. Quality adjustment VND/kg    362  171    155    700  1,460 2,269 2,451 2,334 1,864 2,367 2,426   4,035   3,407   2,835   2,860   2,985   2,450 
7. Adjusted reference 
price (Par)  
VND/kg 1,903 901    811 3,675  7,668 11,91
2 
12,86
9 
12,25
2 
  
9,785 
12,42
4 
12,73
7 
21,183 17,889 14,882 15,016 15,669 12,866 
8. Average farm price 
(Pd)  
VND/kg      84  323 1,700 3,230  3,045 5,489 5,536 7,203   
7,761 
11,20
6 
11,15
7 
10,132 10,412 12,020 10,412   9,728 13,562 
9. Market price support 
(MPS) 
VND bn -
1,106 
-365    582 -307 -
3,395 
-
4,637 
-
6,060 
-
4,481 
-
1,981 
-
1,283 
-
1,722 
-12,862 -9,280 -3,859 -6,581 -9,107   1,057 
10. Market price support 
(MPS) 
% -95.6 -64.3 108.6 -12.5 -60.5 -54.1 -57.2 -41.5 -21.0 -10.2 -12.8   -52.4    -42.0   -19.6    -31.0    -38.2       4.9 
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